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BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
THE LANGUAGE OF THE ARMS RACE: SHOULD THE
PEOPLE LIMIT GOVERNMENT SPEECH?t
RICHARD DELGADO*
In the typical free speech case, a private individual or group challenges the
government's suppression of private speech. At issue is whether the first
amendment prohibits the type of suppression that has occurred.' In recent
years, the growing scale of the government's persuasion apparatus has
prompted a number of scholars to question whether the first amendment has
a reverse side: an implied prohibition on the government that may be
invoked when the people wish to silence the government or when one part of
government seeks to silence another.2 A prominent theme in this "govern-
ment speech" debate is that the government's powerful voice3 can easily
t © 1985 by Richard Delgado.
* Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. J.D., University of
California, Berkeley, 1974. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Barbara Katz
in the preparation of this article. An earlier version of this article was presented at
the University of Michigan Law School, April 1984.
U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... Abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press"). Cases arising from governmental suppression of expres-
sion are legion. E.g., New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951).
2 E.g., M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983); Kamenshine, The First
Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104
(1979); Schauer, Book Review, 35 STAN. L. REV. 373 (1983); Shiffrin, Government
Speech, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 565 (1980); Ziegler, Government Speech and the
Constitution: The Limits of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C.L. REV. 578 (1980); see also
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 697-716 (1970); Van
Alstyne, The First Amendment and the Suppression of Warmongering Propaganda
in the United States: Comments and Footnotes, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 530
(1966).
3 It should be obvious to the reader that "government" rarely speaks with one
"powerful voice." More often, the myriad pronouncements from the Executive and
Legislative branches, and from the many different departments of each, produce a
veritable cacophony. Nevertheless, even this cacophony, because of the prominence
of its source, is quite powerful. Moreover, at least within the Executive branch, there
is a certain degree of enforced orthodoxy, so that the "voice" that speaks is, for all
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overwhelm weaker private voices, creating a monopoly of ideas and inhibit-
ing the dialectic on which we rely to reach decisions.
4
This debate is still unresolved. The Supreme Court has yet to decide
whether certain forms of government speech themselves abridge the free-
dom of speech guaranteed by the first amendment. Nor has the Court
determined whether or to what extent government speech is protected by the
first amendment. Congress also has declined to act on the scholars' invita-
tion by enacting comprehensive legislation regulating the content or the
manner of government speech.
This Article examines the case for limiting government speech in an area
where the case for regulation seems particularly strong: nuclear armaments
and strategy. My thesis is that the Executive branch engages in systematic
dissembling in this area, 5 and that the one-sided views that the government
propagates are unlikely to be corrected in the marketplace of ideas because
of widely shared human response mechanisms 6 and official secrecy. 7 This
situation has profound implications for democratic decision theory8 and
suggests that various remedies may be in order. 9
PROLOGUE: THE CURRENT NUCLEAR SITUATION
As everyone knows, the United States and Soviet Union are engaged in a
nuclear arms race. Despite their importance and frequency throughout his-
tory, not much is known about arms races-how they start or what sustains
them.10 Scholars have even questioned whether the current race between
the Soviet Union and the United States is about anything at all. 1 ' Whatever
intents and purposes, monolithic. With the above caveats in mind, the term "gov-
ernment" is used hereinafter to refer generally to the Executive branch, and the term
"government speech" to refer to the pronouncements of that branch, unless oth-
erwise noted.
4 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 590 (1970); M. YUDOF, supra note
2, at 20-37, 71-110, 155-58; Kamenshine, supra note 2; see Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Holmes
noted the dialectic-serving function of the first amendment: "that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market and that truth is the only ground upon which [the people's] wishes safely can
be carried out." Id.
5 See Part I-A infra (Linguistic Devices).
6 See Part I-B infra (Response Mechanisms).
7 See Part 1I infra (Difficulties With Self-Correction).
1 See Part III infi'a (Constitutional Status of Government Speech on Nuclear
Weaponry).
9 See Part IV inira (Framing A Remedy).
10 Gray, Social Science and the Arms Race, 29 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 23 (June 1973).
" Powers, What Is It About?, 254 ATL. MONTHLY 35, 40-41 (Jan. 1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as What is it About?]; see J. SCHELL, THE ABOLITION (1984) (arms race a
dangerous paradox; society's first order of business should be its abolition); see also
Powers, Nuclear Winter and Nuclear Strategy, 254 ATL. MONTHLY 53, 64 (Nov.
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the reason for it, the current arms race has produced a world bristling with
nuclear weaponry. The Soviet Union and the United States currently pos-
sess, between them, about 50,000 warheads 1 2 and are each building an
additional four to five per day. 13 About 9,000 of the United States' warheads
are "strategic," capable of being launched from American soil and reaching
the Soviet Union. 14 The remainder are located in Europe or other areas close
to the Soviet Union, or are based on submarines. I- Most strategic warheads
have an explosive force in the megaton range, i.e., equivalent to one million
tons of TNT. 16 Large American and Soviet cities are probably targeted with
1984) (U.S. high command unaware of details of country's strategic plan for nuclear
war [hereinafter cited as Nuclear Winter].
1' Nuclear Winter, supra note 11, at 55; Talbott, Arguments Against MADness,
TIME, June 11, 1984, at 84; Mahon, Beyond Rhetoric: Untangling the Logic of the
Nuclear Weapons Debate, ETHICS AND POLICY 3 (Center for Ethics and Social
Policy, undated). Estimates of the number of warheads that the superpowers possess
vary. Compare U.S. Says Russia Leads in Nuclear Warheads, San Francisco
Chronicle, June 18, 1984, at 1, col. 5 (Soviet Union has 34,000 nuclear warheads,
U.S. about 26,000), with Tsipsis & Isaacs, Instruments of War, in THE FINAL
EPIDEMIC: PHYSICIANS AND SCIENTISTS ON NUCLEAR WAR 76, 86-89 (1981) (listing
somewhat smaller figures) [hereinafter cited as THE FINAL EPIDEMIC]; and One
Bomb-One City, 34 F.A.S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT 3, 5 (Federation of American
Scientists, Feb. 1981) (to the same effect); see also JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S.
MILITARY POSTURE (1982); INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES,
THE MILITARY BALANCE (1982); S. ZUCKERMAN, NUCLEAR ILLUSION AND REALITY
15-24 (1982); Blackaby, World Arsenals 1982, 38 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 21, 24-26 (June
1982).
The American arsenal is divided fairly evenly among three types of weaponry,
sometimes spoken of as legs of a triad: land-based weapons, bombers, and sub-
marines. Brown, Strategic Forces and Deterrence, ACIS Working Paper No. 42
(U.C.L.A. Center for International and Strategic Affairs, 1983). The land-based
missiles are relatively vulnerable to preemptive attack, bombers are somewhat less
vulnerable, and submarines are currently invulnerable. S. ZUCKERMAN, supra. The
United States and the Soviet Union seem poised to add a fourth leg to their arsenals,
namely weaponry based in space. Presidential Address of Mar. 28, 1983, reprinted in
DEPT. OF STATE BULL. No. 2672, at 82 (Apr. 1983) ("Star Wars" address).
'3 Mahon, supra note 12, at 3; see S. ZUCKERMAN, 15-24 (1982). The extent to
which these new warheads represent increases in the nuclear stockpile is unclear. In
at least some measure, new warheads replace existing warheads which are then
retired.
14 Mahon, supra note 12, at 3; see also Tsipsis & Isaacs, supra note 12, at 89
(listing slightly smaller figures). But see Bundy, Kennan, McNamara & Smith, The
President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control?, San Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 6,
1985, at Al, col. 1 (10,000 strategic warheads).
15 Mahon, supra note 12, at 3; see also Tsipsis & Isaacs, supra note 12, at 89.
16 See One Bomb-One City, supra note 12, at 5 (table showing size and explosive
capacities of U.S. and Soviet arsenals). The bombs exploded over Hiroshima and
Nagasaki were about one-thousandth as powerful as these. Id. at 3.
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tens of such weapons. 7
In an all-out thermonuclear war, 100 to 150 million Americans would die
from the "prompt" effects of the explosions: blast, heat, and radiation.' 8
Others would die of injuries, fallout, starvation, and breakdowns in sanita-
tion and medical care. 19 Comparable numbers would die in Europe and the
Soviet Union.20 The World Health Organization has estimated that a major
war would kill approximately 1.1 billion persons worldwide from prompt
effects, 2' and a similar number from injuries inflicted in the exchanges.
22
Recent attention has focused on the long-range environmental effects of
nuclear warfare, including planetary temperature changes and damage to the
earth's ozone layer. 23 A number of investigators have warned that these
17 Id. at 6 (using only 3,000 warheads the Soviet Union could attack 60% of the
United States population by targeting 10 warheads at each of the 300 most populous
cities); Nuclear Winter, supra note 11, at 63 (Moscow targeted with 60 warheads,
other Soviet cities with 10 to 40); see also Nuclear War Is National Suicide, 34
F.A.S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT I (Federation of American Scientists, Feb. 1981)
(Soviet Union has 100-200 deliverable weapons capable of leveling the largest U.S.
cities); One Bomb--One City, supra note 12, at 5 ("the numbers of weapons avail-
able to any of the three arms of either of the two superpowers far exceed the number
of cities of consequence on the other side").
8 Raloff, Beyond Armaggedon, 124 Sci. NEWS 314 (Nov. 12, 1983) (quoting
address by Paul Ehrlich at a conference on "The World after Nuclear War").
19 Abrams, Infection and Communicable Diseases, in THE FINAL EPIDEMIC,
supra note 12, at 192; Feld, Mechanics of Fallout, in THE FINAL EPIDEMIC, supra
note 12, at 110; Finch, Occurrence of Cancer in Atomic Bomb Survivors, in THE
FINAL EPIDEMIC, supra note 12, at 151; Hiatt, The Clinical Picture, in THE FINAL
EPIDEMIC, supra note 12, at 169; Lindop & Rotblat, Consequences of Radio-Active
Fallout, in THE FINAL EPIDEMIC, supra note 12, at 117; Raloff, supra note 18, at
314-15.
20 Letter, Physicians for Social Responsibility (Nov, 23, 1983) (on file with au-
thor).
21 Raloff, supra note 18, at 314.
22 Id.
23 Id.; Nuclear Winter, supra note 11, at 55-57; Alexander, Nuclear Winter
Scenario Startled Its Discoverers, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 22, 1984, § I, at 1, col. 5.
A scientific team headed by Paul Ehrlich published calculations based on an earlier
report on the climatic consequences of a major nuclear exchange. Raloff, supra note
18, at 314; A Cold, Dark Apocalypse, TIME, Nov. 14, 1983, at 43 [hereinafter cited as
Apocalypse]. The Ehrlich team found that the dust and soot that would be released
into the atmosphere would cause the planet's temperature to fall approximately 72
degrees Fahrenheit (to below freezing in most places). Most farm plants would be
killed by frost, and seeds would not germinate. The food cycle of wild animals would
be interrupted; most would die. Livestock not moved into heated buildings would
also die. The amount of sunlight reaching the planet's surface would be reduced by 90
to 95 percent; most photosynthetic activity in trees and plants would stop. Chemical
smog from industrial fires would cover most of Europe, the United States, and the
Soviet Union. These effects would last for three to five years. During that time, the
[Vol. 64: 961
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changes could render the planet uninhabitable to human life.2 4
Whether these grim scenarios will materialize is, of course, disputed.
Some believe that mutual deterrence 25 will work and that the danger of an
accidental launch is low. 26 Others believe that a major war between the
superpowers is likely before the end of the century.2 7 These disputes aside,
survivors of a nuclear attack would face an existence of extreme hardship; there
would be little food, fuel, medical care, and the climate would be intensely inhospita-
ble. Raloff, supra note 18, at 314-15; Apocalypse, supra.
Other studies have focused on depletion of the earth's ozone layer. Alexander,
supra (reviewing two studies of soot and ozone effects, one by Swedish Academy of
Science, other by Carl Sagan); Mark, Nuclear Weapons: Characteristics and Capa-
bilities, in THE FINAL EPIDEMIC, supra note 12, at 105-06. Located high in the
stratosphere, this layer is responsible for screening out much of the sun's ultraviolet
radiation. Several nuclear explosions within a short time would deplete this layer,
resulting in an intense level of ultraviolet radiation at ground level. Strong ultraviolet
radiation has a number of adverse physiological consequences-sunburn, skin
cancer, and damage to the retina of the eye. Human survivors would need to wear
sunglasses while outdoors to protect against permanent loss of eyesight. Livestock
would have to be confined to sheds or shelters. Birds and other wild animals would be
blinded; many would starve to death, unable to feed themselves. Id. Many of these
predictions were recently confirmed by a National Academy of Sciences study
commissioned by the Defense Department. Rensberger, Study Backs Possibility of
"Nuclear Winter", Phila. Inquirer, Dec. 12, 1984, at 6-A, col. 1.
Other scientists have disputed these effects or offered more optimistic estimates of
the number of casualties a nuclear war would produce. Edward Teller, for example,
has written that "we can survive a nuclear attack, we can dig out of the ruins; we can
recover from the catastrophe." E. TELLER, THE LEGACY OF HIROSHIMA 244 (1967)
24 See sources cited supra note 23; Harris, Can't Avoid "Nuclear Winter" by
Going South, Scientist Says, San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle, Feb. 10, 1985, at
B5, col. I (nuclear winter would engulf southern as well as northern hemisphere).
25 "Deterrence" is the name for the strategic approach, followed by both the U.S.
and U.S.S.R., that assumes that military might can prevent war by making an attack
too costly for the attacker. See P. GREEN, DEADLY LOGIC: THE THEORY OF Nu-
CLEAR DETERRENCE (1966); R. SCHEER, WITH ENOUGH SHOVELS 123 (1982); S.
ZUCKERMAN, supra note 12, at 41-58; Brown, supra note 12; Nitze, Assuring
Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 207 (1976). The U.S.
position may be moving in the direction of defense against nuclear attack, in the form
of space-based weapons able to shoot down incoming missiles shortly after launch.
See Presidential Address of Mar. 23, 1983, reprinted in DEPT. OF STATE BULL. No.
2672, at 82 (April 1983) ("Star Wars" Address).
26 R. SCHEER, supra note 25, at 3-26 (summarizing views of military establishment
and Reagan administration); see also infra note 27 (discussing accidents and close
calls).
27 See, e.g., Kistiakowsky, Carrying the Message, 37 BULL. ATOM. SCI. 10 (Mar.
1981) (war before end of century "highly probable"); Steel, The Statesman of
Survival, ESQUIRE, Jan. 1985, at 68, 72 ("I see the situation now with an almost total
pessimism .... I'm afraid that the cards today are lined up for a war, a dreadful and
final war.") (interview with George Kennan) [hereinafter cited as Kennan Interview];
1984]
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the nuclear arms race itself is alleged to exact a psychological toll, particu-
larly on children and young adults. 28 Investigators have found that many
young children suffer from fears and nightmares about the destruction of the
world. 29 Older children may show skepticism about the future, and a ten-
see also Is Nuclear Warfare Inevitable?, Sacramento Bee, Sept. 12, 1984, at A14, col.
I (Stanford professor Martin Hellman uses a statistic principle, the Borel Zero-One
Law, to show that nuclear confrontation is inevitable). Atomic bombs have been
dropped on enemy targets, on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but of course deterrence was
not a factor then-the Japanese lacked nuclear weapons, and the United States
risked little in using them. Since the Soviet Union's development of nuclear
weapons, there have been a number of alerts and close calls that, according to some,
could have resulted in a conflagration but were caught in time. E.g., Hansen, Rising
Risks of Missile Accidents, Phila. Inquirer, Jan 4, 1985, at 7-A, col. 1; In Northern
Darkness, Finns Look Jor Mystery Missile, Phila. Inquirer, Jan. 4, 1985, at 7-A, col.
1; see also Colby, There's No Need for the Risky MX: Missile Would Promote
Hair-Trigger Posture Dangerous to All, Los Angeles Times, May 14, 1984, § 2 at 5,
col. 1 (reporting that the Pentagon has already received more than 100 false alerts). In
1946, President Truman explicitly threatened the Soviets with atomic bombing if they
did not comply with demands to withdraw from Iran. What is it About?, supra note
11, at 35, 43. In 1979, a practice tape was inserted by mistake in a computer in the
Defense Command Center, with the result that the operators believed the Soviets had
launched a massive attack on the United States. The bombers almost took off.
Molander, How I Learned to Start Worrying and Hate The Bomb, Wash. Post, Mar.
2, 1982, § D (Outlook), at D-1, D-5. In 1980 a microchip failed in a computer at the
Strategic Air Command, with the same result. Id.
28 Amer. Psych. Ass'n, Task Force Rep. #20, Psychosocial Aspects of Nuclear
Developments (1982) [hereinafter cited as Task Force Report]; Lifton, False God,
226 ATL. MONTHLY 104 (Oct. 1970). Although the effects of the arms race are most
pronounced on children, adults, too, suffer. One psychiatrist attributed a current
increase in personality disorders, irresponsible behavior, and drug use in part to the
sense of hopelessness induced by the possibility of nuclear annihilation. Adults lose a
sense of the continuity of life, through children or accomplishments; all could be
wiped out at a single stroke. Citizens withdraw from involvement, stop volunteering
for pollution patrols or unpaid work at hospitals. They cease working on long-term
projects. Address by Robert Gorney, M.D., Professor of Psychiatry, at U.C.L.A.
Law School, Nov. 9, 1983; see also Frank, Psychological Aspects of the Nuclear
Arms Race, 32 BULL. ATOM. Sci 22 (April 1976) (discussing psychological impacts
of arms race on leaders).
29 Yudkin, When Kids Think the Unthinkable, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Apr. 1984, at
18 (nightmares, fears of being blown up, and belief that there is no future common in
sample of 10-18 year old American school children); see also Chan, The Nuclear
Syndrome, USA Today, Aug. 1, 1983, at 4-D, col. 6; Mack, Psychosocial Effects of
the Nuclear Arms Race, 37 BULL. ATOM. ScL. 18, 18-19 (1981) (Boston grammar and
high school students do not want to raise their children in a world of horror, fear that
the world could blow up tomorrow, and fear that the human race is running out of
time).
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dency to plan in hypothetical terms, viz., "If I finish high school .... ,,30
Even if predictions of nuclear disaster prove to be alarmist, therefore, the
arms race exacts a significant cost in current anxiety.
I. THE LANGUAGE OF THE ARMS RACE: LINGUISTIC DEVICES AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESPONSE MECHANISMS
The nuclear reality just reviewed is, if nothing else, unsettling. Left to its
own devices, the citizenry thus might well press for measures to reduce the
magnitude of the threat, such as reduction in the number of existing
warheads and enactment of international agreements limiting deployment of
new weapons systems. Government communication on nuclear arms, how-
ever, has included a number of psycholinguistic devices whose practical
effect is to check the flow of information and silence effective dissent. Part A
of this section reviews those devices; part B examines response mechanisms
that give the devices unusual power and effect.
A. Linguistic Devices
1. Euphemism and Metaphor
As author George Orwell and others have pointed out, governments often
use euphemisms-words that put a positive gloss on a frightening object or
event-to justify their actions and rally the citizenry. 31 When successful,
euphemisms cause the reader to respond to a word's innocent or positive
connotations, rather than the threatening reality it conceals. Euphemisms
heighten and facilitate a psychological mechanism, denial, discussed in the
next section.
Metaphors and similes serve similar functions-they borrow meanings
and attitudes from one context and apply them to another. Like
euphemisms, metaphors and similes may reinforce the audience's uncon-
scious response mechanisms that block out the threat. Some euphemisms
and metaphors may be coined unconsciously, as a means for the speaker to
avoid confronting a terrible reality. Other euphemisms seem to have been
designed deliberately to mislead the public. For example, in the early days of
nuclear power, publicists urged that reports be "word-engineered" to reas-
30 See sources cited supra note 29; address of Robert Gorney, M.D., Professor of
Psychiatry, at U.C.L.A. Law School, Nov. 9, 1983.
31 G. ORWELL, 1984, at 246 (Signet ed. 1971) (Appendix: The Principles of News-
peak); Orwell, Politics and the English Language, in SHOOTING AN ELEPHANT 77
(1950); see also D. GRABER, VERBAL BEHAVIOR AND POLITICS 305-08 (1976); S.
HILGARTNER; R. BELL & R. O'CONNOR, NUKESPEAK, NUCLEAR LANGUAGE, VI-
SIONS, AND MINDSET (1982); Gambino, Public Doublespeak: A Glossary of Evasive
Language in Government, 63 ENG. J. 24 (1974); GREEN, supra note 25, at 222-23;
Nash, The Bureaucratization of Homicide, in PROTEST AND SURVIVE 149 (1981).
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sure the public. 32 Units of radiation became "sunshine units." ' 33 Publicists
and government officials spoke of presenting the "sunny side" of the
atom.
34
Euphemism proliferates in times of war. 35 Thus, in Vietnam, bombers
gave "close air support ' 36 and carriedout "protective reaction strikes" or
"reconnaissance by fire." 37 Regiofis were "pacified," targets were "taken
out," and our side sustained "casualties. ' 38 The recent American invasion
of Grenada was called a "rescue mission. ' 39 The Soviets also use
euphemism-their 100,000 troop force that invaded Afghanistan was de-
scribed as a "limited contingent."
40
Nuclear strategy and weaponry are also prime breeding grounds for
euphemism. Apocalyptic weapons promote "deterrence" (the ability to
react to an enemy nation's political or military initiatives with nuclear
force), 4 1 are used as "bargaining chips," or help avoid a "window of
vulnerability. ' 42 Potentially cataclysmic nuclear attacks are "surgical
strikes" aimed at "counterforce" targets and inflicting "collateral dam-
age. ' 43 Cities are to be "interdicted," not "destroyed. ' 44 "Tactical"
weapons are devised for "theater" wars. 45 A huge, deadly missile was
initially named "Peacemaker. ' 46 The Pentagon called the neutron bomb a
32 S. HILGARTNER, R. BELL AND R. O'CONNOR, supra note 31, at 159 (report on
the leave or retrieve decision on nuclear waste containers released only after being
"word engineered").
33 Id. at 219.
34 Id. at 33, 38. See also infra notes 73 and 118.
35 See Hechinger, Down with Doublespeak, San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle,
Feb. 24, 1985, "This World" Section, at 19, col. 2 (doublespeak and euphemism
"kill[] people's sensitivity to violations of human rights"); Rubin, State Dept. "Doub-
lespeak" Wins Bad-Language Award, Phila. Inquirer, Nov. 18, 1984, at 5-C, (giving
examples, including Pentagon's redefinition of "peace" as "permanent pre-
hostility," and "combat" as "violence processing").
36 Friedrich, Of Words that Ravage, Pillage, Spoil, TIME, Jan. 9, 1984, at 76.
37 Nash, supra note 31, at 150.
38 D. GRABER, supra note 31, at 305-08.
39 Friedrich, supra note 36; Skelton, No Other Invasion "On Horizon," Reagan
Says, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 4, 1983, § I, at 1, col. 1. A strategic retreat of
American troops in Lebanon to a safer position in offshore ships was called a
"redeployment." Rubin, supra note 35.
40 Address by Mitties McDonald, "Nukespeak: Language, Values and Control,"
at U.C.L.A., Jan. 24, 1984.
41 Thompson, A Letter to America, in PROTEST AND SURVIVE 45 (1981).
42 Address by Mitties McDonald, supra note 40.
43 Id.; Thompson, supra note 41, at 13.
44 S. ZUCKERMAN, supra note 12, at 41.
45 Thompson, supra note 41, at 32.
46 Rubin, supra note 35. The missile was subsequently renamed the "MX." Other
missiles have lyrical or heroic-sounding names, e.g., "Trident" and "Minuteman."
968' [Vol. 64: 961
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"radiation enhancement weapon," a designation which won the agency an
award from the Committee on Public Doublespeak. 47 Nuclear bombs are
simple "devices." Nuclear attacks are "exchanges" (like Christmas pre-
sents) or "flexible responses." ' 48 New weapons are members of a "nuclear
family."49
Metaphors and similes also figure prominently in the nuclear lexicon.
Military talk is often couched in the language of sports: the Pentagon devel-
ops a "game plan," making plans to "take out" enemy cities and installa-
tions.A0 As in sports, mistakes are admitted "in hindsight." 5' Historical and
physical analogies are also common. The government compares the Soviets
to past enemies and urges the people to avoid repeating the error of ap-
peasement.5 2 Our strategic aim is to preserve "equilibrium" and avoid a
"power vacuum."5 3 These analogies convey the idea that the events they
describe are regular and predictable, even law-like. 54 The disaster that may
be only one miscalculation or misjudgment away remains hidden.55
2. Fear-Appeals
When they deem it necessary to rouse rather than lull, governments may
use fear-appeals and depictions of a terrifying enemy.5 6 This practice may be
47 Doublespeaking, Telling It Like It Isn't, TIME, Dec. 5, 1977, at 33. The U.S.
State Department won the 1984 award for redefining the word "killing" as "unlawful
or arbitrary deprivation of life." Rubin, supra note 35.
48 S. HILGARTNER, R. BELL & R. O'CONNOR, supra note 31, at 218.
49 Nash, supra note 31, at 158.
50 Gambino, supra note 31.
51 Id.
52 R. SCHEER, supra note 25, at 44; Moyer, The Enemy Within, PSYCH. TODAY,
Jan. 1985, at 30, 33. Some would agree, of course, with the metaphor, believing it an
apt description of the Soviet threat. See infra note 198 (euphemism sometimes lies in
eye of the beholder).
53 Nash, supra note 31, at 157-160.
54 Id.
15 The policy of nuclear deterrence, for example, requires the maintenance of an
enormous arsenal, which contains enough warheads to end the world several times
over. This policy, while dictating that each side possess such a destructive capacity
and profess a willingness to unleash it, is defended as an avenue to peace through
strength. This phrase conjures up images of castle walls and moats, or a guard in a
security building, and masks the ominous threat inherent in such a policy. See Nash,
supra note 31, at 152-54; Beardslee & Mack, The Impact on Children and Adoles-
cents of Nuclear Developments, in Task Force Report, supra note 28, at 64.
56 Frank, Survival in a Nuclear World-Some Psychological Considerations, in
DISARMAMENT: THE HUMAN FACTOR 63, 64 (1978); Nash, supra note 31, at 152-53,
156; see N. CHOMSKY, TOWARDS A NEW COLD WAR: ESSAYS ON THE CURRENT
CRISIS AND How WE GOT THERE 192 (1982); R. LIFTON & R. FALK, INDEFENSIBLE
WEAPONS 208-225 (1982); H. MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN 51 (1961); Frank,
Sociopsychological Aspects of the Nuclear Arms Race, in Task Force Report, supra
1984]
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a near-universal psychosocial activity. Students of myths note that all soci-
eties invent legends of evil enemy forces to increase solidarity and mobilize
collective action. 57 Bomber gaps, missile gaps, and windows of vulnerability
generate fear and uncertainty and justify military spending. 58 President
Reagan's "focus of evil" speech 59 was a patent attempt to elicit support for
continuing the arms race. Such fear appeals are most effective when they
contain an element of truth. For example, during the period when the missile
gap was being created and publicized, the U.S. lagged behind the Soviets in
land-based missiles. The U.S. held a large lead, however, in submarine-
based and cruise missiles. There is serious disagreement about whether the
U.S. was ever in a position worse than parity.
60
Fear appeals are sometimes alternated with rhetorical devices aimed at
soothing and reassuring. At other times these functions are carried out
simultaneously. Fear and reassurance must be kept in balance; a citizenry
presented only with horror pictures might refuse to cooperate with war
preparations or become so paralyzed that it ceases to function.
note 28, at 6-7; Lazere, Camus on Doublespeak, 66 ENG. J. 24, 25 (Oct. 1977);
Thompson, supra note 41, at 15, 42-43.
17 G. CUTHBERTSON, POLITICAL MYTH AND REALITY 121-28, 157-160, 187 (1975);
see Thompson, supra note 41, at 42-43; see also Johnson & La Rocque, The Mythol-
ogy of National Defense, 30 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 21 (Sept. 1974) (discussing myths
underlying demands for increased defense spending).
Myths of evil enemies are often accompanied by myths portraying one's own group
in a positive light. See H. LANDON & A. WEEKS, MYTHS THAT RULE AMERICA
(1980); see also Reagan Says God Backs Budget, San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 5,
1985, at I, col. 1 ("Beginning a campaign to sell his new budget proposal, President
Reagan asserted yesterday that the Lord and the Scriptures are on his side in his
struggle . . . to continue the U.S. defense buildup.").
58 R. SCHEER, supra note 26, at 66-67; see Kennan Interview, supra note 28, at 70
("image of the Soviet opponent in his most terrible, desperate, and inhuman aspect:
an implacable monster"); id. at 73 (scare pictures used to inflate military estimates).
19 Address to National Association of Evangelicals, March 8, 1983, at Orlando,
Florida, reprinted in 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 364, 369 (Mar. 14, 1983). In a
recent article in PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Professor Robert Moyer hypothesized that the
President's remarks were a natural product of two widely used psychological defense
mechanisms: dehumanization and projection. By dehumanizing our enemies and
projecting our own undesirable characteristics onto them, Moyer suggests, we make
it "easy to see ourselves as good, peace-loving and self-defense oriented, and portray
our enemies as evil, aggressive and warlike .... Almost any Soviet or American
foreign-policy statement will illustrate this point." Moyer, supra note 52, at 33.
Professor Moyer cites the "focus of evil" speech as an example of this phenomenon.
Id.
60 See sources cited supra notes 12-13; see also Negotiation by the Numbers,
TIME, Jan. 7, 1985, at 66.
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3. Abstraction and Technical Detail: the Nuclear Priesthood
A third device the government uses in its communication is abstraction
and technical obfuscation. This device, in turn, aids in creating a caste of
nuclear experts or priests. 6' Government's use of arcane language, graphs,
acronyms, and other insider speech makes relatively simple strategic con-
cepts difficult to understand. Sterile or abstract terms also blunt the horror of
the reality they depict. As one author stated: "The quality of universal death
grows stale partly because the arguments are unnecessarily complex ... and
use terms that pointedly mute just what it is these bombs will do, which is to
start with, to kill the people one loves and nearly everyone else as well."
62
Technical talk has a soothing sound. The thought that someone has made a
deadly subject a science comforts the listener; it implies that the problem is
under control. 63 Technical talk serves similar functions for the expert, enabl-
ing him or her to divorce himself or herself from the human consequences of
nuclear warfare. Technical talk may also render effective criticisms impossi-
ble, and reinforce the audience's impression that the expert's task is esoteric
and important.
64
61 N. CHOMSKY, supra note 56, at 66; S. HILGARTNER, R. BELL & R. O'CONNOR
supra note 31, at 58, 142.
62 R. SCHEER, supra note 26, at 15; see Mack, supra note 29, at 23 (criticizing this
sterile approach, and emphasizing the need for honest confrontation of the weapon's
destructive potential). In a nonnuclear context, Albert Camus commented on the
contemporary euphemizing of murder. In THE PLAGUE, Tarrous, the principal
character, says, "I'd come to realize that all our troubles [with murder] spring from
our failure to use plain, clean-cut language. So I resolved always to speak-and to
act-quite clearly." Lazere, supra note 56, at 24 (quoting A. CAMus, THE PLAGUE).
In another work, a spokesman for the dictatorial government explains that govern-
ment's use of legalistic jargon: "It's intended to get them used to that touch of
obscurity which gives all government regulations their peculiar charm and efficacy.
The less these people understand, the better they'll behave." Camus, State of Siege,
in CALIGULA AND THREE OTHER PLAYS 165 (S. Gilbert trans. 1962).
63 R. LIFTON & R. FALK, supra note 56, at 107; Mack, Psychosocial Trauma, in
THE FINAL EPIDEMIC, supra note 12, at 22; Nash, supra note 31, at 153; Thompson,
supra note 41, at 3, 9-11, 14.
64 See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text; Nash, supra note 31, at 150-152;
Thompson, supra note 41, at 10; see also P. LOEB, NUCLEAR CULTURE 189, 192
(1982); What is It About?, supra note 11, at 36, 42; Molander, supra note 27, at D-5.
A nuclear priesthood need not promote deception; it may exist to promulgate the
truth. For example, one member of the Human Interference Task Force, a study
panel contracted by the Deparment of Energy, proposed "the creation of an 'atomic
priesthood' to pass along, over the millenniums, rituals and legends that would
explain the dangers of waste dumps." Warning Symbols, TIME, Nov. 26, 1984, at 44.
1984]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
4. Doublespeak, Weasel-Words, and Lies
Government speech frequently contains language that is deceptive in
various degrees. Orwell wrote of doublespeak; 65 lawyers speak of weasel
words, which enable the speaker to seem to answer a question without really
doing so. When first presenting the neutron bomb to the public, the defense
department acted and spoke as though the weapon were not a nuclear
bomb. 66 President Reagan recently explained that United States marines in
Lebanon were not engaged in "hostilities" because incoming artillery fire
was not directed specifically at them, but merely at the area in which they
were encamped. 67 During the 1960's and 1970's, thousands of pounds of
plutonium and uranium were discovered to be missing from nuclear sites. 68
Despite strong circumstantial evidence that some of this was stolen, nuclear
developers and agencies have repeatedly claimed that there is no evidence of
theft. 69 The SALT II agreement, which the current administration has
agreed to abide by, obliges countries not to build additional fixed ICBM
launchers. Asked whether a proposal to build new bases for the MX missile
would not violate the Salt II agreement, the Secretary of Defense replied that
it would not. When pressed, he explained that "a silo is not a launcher." 70
Doublespeak sometimes approaches self-parody, as when General Wil-
liam Westmoreland justified manipulation of the news on the ground that
"[w]ithout censorship things can get terribly confused in the public mind."
7'
A Secretary of State declared that American arms buildup is "absolutely
essential to . . . hopes for meaningful arms reduction. ' 72 During the early
days of nuclear power, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) suppressed a
65 G. ORWELL, supra note 31, at Appendix; Dietrich & Isaacson, ERIC/RCS
Report: Doublespeak, 62 ENGL. J. 1053 (Oct. 1973); Orwell, supra note 31; see
Slater, Orwell, Marcuse, and the Language of Politics, 23 POL. STUD. 459 (Dec.
1975) (Orwell's writings reflect his concern that language can be corrupted to justify
political and other events).
66 See S. ZUCKERMAN, supra note 12, at 67 (defense department spread impres-
sion that neutron bomb is in a category of weapons totally different from nuclear
devices).
67 This was more than a semantic quibble; at issue was whether the deployment of
troops triggered the provisions of the War Powers Resolution. Glennon, Abiding by
This Law Is Necessaryfor Our National Unity, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 15, 1983, §
I, at 7, col. 1.
68 S. HILGARTNER, R. BELL & R. O'CONNOR, supra note 31, at 169.
69 Id. at 169, 171, 172; cf. Knoll, Censors at Work, THE PROGRESSIVE, Apr. 1984,
at 4 (federal government warned newspaper chain it faced prosecution for receiving
documents showing that enough uranium is missing to make 85 nuclear bombs).
70 Phila. Inquirer, Nov. 21, 1982, at 4-A, col. 1.
71 Humphrey, Four Minutes to Midnight, 130 THE OTHER SIDE 10, 12 (July 1982)
(quoting Gen. William Westmoreland).
72 Phila. Inquirer, May 12, 1982, at I-A, col. 1.
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key report showing need for caution on the ground that "[wle thought it
would be misunderstood by the public."
73
At times, the government has resorted to deceptive use of statistics or
outright misstatements of fact to win public support or avoid criticism. When
fallout from a hydrogen bomb test drifted outside the test range, the AEC
chairman denied that Japanese fishermen had suffered radiation burns or
that fish had been contaminated, although both were known to have hap-
pened.7 4 In making his case for increased defense spending, President Rea-
gan recently asserted that the Soviet Union is ahead of the United States in
"virtually every measure of military power." ' 75 What he neglected to men-
tion was that the U.S. holds a commanding lead in nuclear warheads




By means of such devices as euphemism, abstraction, and doublespeak,
the government fosters a world view in which its assumptions and aims are
unlikely to be seriously questioned. Because of the way government defines
reality, certain thoughts do not come to mind. Through a kind of mass
taboo-formation, ideas and options are placed out of bounds. 78 In many
71 S. HILGARTNER, R. BELL & R. O'CONNOR, supra note 31, at 119; cf. id. at 77-78
(AEC suppressed a damaging nuclear energy study at the request of public relations
officer of Pacific Gas & Electric).
74 Id. at 97-100; see Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 346 (D. Utah 1984)
(U.S. government downplayed hazards of radiation); see also Anderson, Atomic
Test Case: For Radiation Victims Justice A Generation Later, TIME, May 21, 1984,
at 40 (government found to have failed to warn Utah and Arizona residents of known
danger of radioactive fallout from 102 atomic bomb tests); Curry, U.S. Is Ordered to
Pay Victims of Nuclear Tests, L.A. Times, May 11, 1984, at 1, col. 5 (quoting judge
in Allen: "There is just nothing wrong with telling the American people the truth.").
75 Phila. Inquirer, Nov. 21, 1982, at 4-A, col. 1.
76 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
77 The import of such comparisons is subject to much debate. See Negotiation by
the Numbers, TiME, Jan. 7. 1985, at 66. What is troubling, however, is the Presi-
dent's apparent attempt to dismiss this debate and create the impression that the U.S.
is on the losing side of "virtually every" comparison. Another troubling example is
the frequent use of comparisons with Soviet defense budgets to justify continued
U.S. defense spending at high levels. Because of the very different natures of the two
economies, estimates for the Soviet Union are extremely difficult and comparisons
inexact. See N. CHOMSKY, supra note 56, at 193 & n.105 (accusing government of
using false bases for comparison); Slowdown Reported in Soviet Buildup, San Fran-
cisco Chronicle, Feb. 23, 1985, at 10, col. 1 (Soviet defense expenditures smaller than
previously reported).
78 Gambino, supra note 31, at 24 (government has evolved a stock language that
acts as a conceptual contraceptive, preventing the discussion of personal responsibil-
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cases, the means used to attain this result are not agitational; the language is
not perceived to be political.
79
In addition to their generalized discourse-shaping effect, government
communications in the area of weaponry may acquire peculiar potency by
tapping unconscious response mechanisms. These mechanisms include de-
nial and numbness, identification with the source of danger, and submission
to a strong leader.8 0 Leaders may be equally affected; the language used
enables them to maintain a collective illusion of safety while denying their
individual responsibility for the threat.8 1
1. Denial and Numbness
One mechanism that enables individuals to deal with life-threatening
events is denial. 82 The mind cannot easily comprehend a threat so huge as
ity); see N. CHOMSKY, supra note 56, at 84, 102 (the American educational system
has socialized scholars to ignore documentary records contrary to accepted opinion);
D. GRABER, supra note 31, at 305 (the name given an object or concept places it
within a group for comparison purposes; audience reactions can be controlled by
avoiding names with negative connotations); S. HILGARTNER, R. BELL & R. O'CON-
NOR, supra note 31, passim (nukespeak renders atrocities invisible through the use of
sterile words); Tushnet, Book Review, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 129, 134-44 (governmental
communications have an enormous impact on the public).
79 See M. EDELMAN, POLITICAL LANGUAGE: WORDS THAT SUCCEED AND POLI-
CIES THAT FAIL 21 (1977) (fundamental influences upon political beliefs flow from
categorizations based on unacknowledged ideological premises contained in language
that structures perceptions of status, authority, merit, deviance, and the causes of
social problems); Pocock, Verbalizing a Political Act: Towards a Theory of Speech, 1
POL. THEORY 27 (1973) (communication control by government can lead to political
enslavement, as those whose language is controlled must communicate through
meanings dictated by others); see also Schlesinger, Politics and the American Lan-
guage, 43 AM. SCHOLAR 553, 557, (1973-7) (language shapes development of ideas).
The manner in which government speech attains particular prominence is discussed
infra, at notes 133-41, 183-88 and accompanying text.
80 Lifton, supra note 28, at 104, 106, 109-10.
81 See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text; see also Kennan Interview,
supra note 27, at 70 ("the view of the Soviet Union that prevails today in large
portions of our governmental ... establishment [is so] extreme, so subjective, so far
removed from ... reality ... that it is not only ineffective but dangerous as a guide
to political action").
82 R. LIFTON & R. FALK, supra note 56, at 100-02 (in order to protect itself, the
psyche will limit what it feels; this numbing enables person to deny threat); id. at 6
(the mind sees, but suppresses, the nuclear threat); Frank, Psychological Aspects of
the Nuclear Arms Race, 32 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 22 (1976) (relative unconcern for
dangers inherent in nuclear proliferation stems from inability to comprehend, and
therefore to admit, the threat); Lifton, supra note 28, at 104-05 (man achieves a sense
of immortality in the face of inevitable death through his offspring, theology, crea-
tions, and experiential transcendence); Moyer, supra note 52, at 30 (to cope with the
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nuclear holocaust; it therefore shuts it out, ceasing entirely to respond. A
recent American Psychiatric Association Task Force found that many adults
responded to the threat of nuclear annihilation by distancing, numbness, or
"psychic shutdown. ' 83 Children and adolescents showed a similar reac-
tion. 84 The government's use of technical jargon accentuates this response;
one author called government publicists "hired anesthetists. ' 85 Once
numbness and denial set in, psycholinguistic devices like those discussed in
Section A help maintain these mechanisms in place.
An extreme form of denial has been observed in some nuclear workers and
strategic analysts. Workers in nuclear weapons plants gave shallow re-
sponses when questioned about their work; the work was "just a job" that
"pays the bills;" and weapons were "just a part of life" that will always be
with us. 86 Many workers lost themselves in technical details, or rationalized
that weapons are necessary because it is human nature to be cruel and
warlike. 87 Many use drugs. 88 Nuclear strategists who have left their posi-
tions have written that the only way they could carry out their tasks was to
numb themselves, to see only numbers and symbols on a map.
89
2. Embracing the Threat
While some deal with life threatening events by denying them, a smaller
group copes with the possibility of nuclear destruction by embracing the
threat of nuclear weapons, people often refuse to acknowledge the possibility of
nuclear war or they deny that nuclear war would have terrible consequences); see
also J. KOVEL, AGAINST THE STATE OF NUCLEAR TERROR (1983) (passivity and
denial enable mankind to do nothing in face of threat to species greater than that
anyone would tolerate if aimed at himself or herself alone).
83 Introduction, in Task Force Report, supra note 28, at vi, ii; see Frank, Socio-
psychological Aspects of the Nuclear Arms Race, in Task Force Report, supra note
28, at 1.
84 Beardslee & Mack, The Impact on Children and Adolescents of Nuclear Devel-
opments, in Task Force Report, supra note 28, at 64, 67 (citing Psychiatric Aspects of
the Prevention of Nuclear War (Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, 1964)).
But see Yudkin, supra note 29, at 25 (very young children are unable to use this
defense against nuclear fear; they develop the denial mechanism only at about age
twelve).
85 R. LIFTON & R. FALK, supra note 56, at 107; cf. 4 G. ORWELL, COLLECTED
ESSAYS, JOURNALISM AND LETTERS 167 (1971) (repetition used by government to
instill "gramophone mind").
86 p. LOEB, NUCLEAR CULTURE 39, 44, 102, 192 (1983); see id. at 78-79 (practice
alerts at nuclear plants likened to routine fire drills); id. at 203-04 (to some, atomic
weapons are "just another step in human progress").
87 Id. at 203-04 (without civilization and the fear of retribution, people become
animalistic).
88 Id. at 44, 204, 206.
89 See, e.g., Molander, supra note 27; Nash, supra note 31, at 149, 160.
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threat. These individuals become fascinated with and absorbed in the details
of strategic planning, warhead counts, and weapons systems. 90 Robert Lif-
ton calls this syndrome, which he purports to find in some military decision-
makers and strategists, "nucleirism." 91 The nuclearist views the bomb as
akin to a deity: all-powerful, vengeful, destructive, and arbitrary. Nuclear
weapons, like a god, must not be limited. 92 As with the opposite response,
numbing, the preoccupation of nuclearism disables the individual from act-
ing constructively to improve his or her situation. 93 Nuclearists are uncriti-
cal advocates of new weaponry: they resist questioning the need for more
weapons because the weapons are self-validating.
94
3. Desire for a Strong Leader
A final response to situations of anxiety is desire for a strong leader-
someone who, like a father, will protect his charges and set everything
right. 95 This desire is part of a generalized human reaction to crisis: in times
of stress, one wants a strong person to take charge and reduce the stress. 96
This propensity facilitates development of a nuclear priesthood, a group of
experts who are invested with wide-ranging powers and are beyond ordinary
accountability. 97 That the priests speak in arcane language and work in
90 Lifton, supra note 28, at 105, 109; see R. LIFTON & R. FALK, supra note 56, at
80-90 (many are fascinated with nuclear destruction, and embrace nuclear power as
something close to a deity).
91 R. LIFTON & R. FALK, supra note 56, at ix, 87; Lifton, supra note 28, at 106,
109.
92 R. LIFTON & R. FALK, supra note 56, at 80-92; Lifton, supra note 28, passim.
93 Lifton, supra note 28, at 109-10; see R. LIFTON & R. FALK supra note 56, at 31
(nuclearism prevents the informed exchanges and realistic appraisals necessary for
constructive policies).
94 See R. LIFTON & R. FALK, supra note 56, at 91 ("[S]cientific duty demand[s]
exploration of ... making [the hydrogen bomb] .... We ... must not try to limit the
use of weapons."); Lifton, supra note 28, at 109 ("To those who would have us stop
our tests ... I would therefore say, 'These tests ... serve as an effective substitute
for war.' "); see also Nash, supra note 31, at 149 (writer who worked in the Air
Targets Division of the Air Force helping select Soviet targets for nuclear warheads
wrote that he and his co-workers spoke of "nominating" cities and industrial
facilities for destruction; they were pleased when their "nominees" were selected for
inclusion in the strategic plan).
91 Introduction, in Task Force Report, supra note 28, at vi, 1, 2; see R. LIFTON &
R. FALK, supra note 56, at 147 (citizens are requested to leave nuclear policy to the
president, who knows more than anyone else); Mack, supra note 29, at 18 (people
resist involvement in nuclear issue; they tend to want to "leave it to the experts").
96 See M. EDELMAN, supra note 79, at 77 (although agencies and administrators
actually control citizen's lives, individuals tend to pin all hopes and fears on the
president's actions); Frank, Survival in a Nuclear World--Some Psychological Con-
siderations, in DISARMAMENT: THE HUMAN FACTOR 88 (1978).
97 See R. LIFTON & R. FALK, supra note 56, at 31 (mythology surrounding the
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secrecy only heightens their appeal. 98 Their isolation and special vocabulary
may also encourage arbitrariness and a diminished sense of moral responsi-
bility on their part. 99 One ex-strategist reported that "[t]here were no people
in these [fictional] 'exchanges,' only calculations. It was a curious fiction,
never discussing the humans at the military installations or the industries or
the cities. I guess that made it easier on the targeters in Omaha, the people
there in charge of launching the missiles ... and the analysts like me." 100
The ex-analyst comforted himself with the thought that others above him
were responsible for the human dimension of war planning. 10 1 It was not
until years later that he discovered, to his shock, that, like him, his superiors
lived in a vague world of figures and symbols.1
0 2
bomb guarantees the perpetuation of dangerous self-deception and prevents informed
exchange); S. HILGARTNER, R. BELL & R. O'CONNOR, supra note 31, at 58, 142
(government classification of information creates a secret society whose members
control flow of information through the principle of compartmentalization and the
need to know doctrine); see also Moyer, supra note 52, at 34-35 (leaders' mindset
constrained by rigid preconceptions).
98 R. LIFTON & R. FALK, supra note 56, at 31. The citizenry's attitude may, in
turn, enhance the leaders' own sense of mission and infallibility. See supra notes
95-96 and accompanying text. The leaders' peer group is generally composed of
like-minded persons who generate further pressures to conform to the prevailing
mind-set. Their command of secrecy and their power to classify information as secret
emphasizes their priestlike status, both in their own minds and those of their follow-
ers. See R. LIFTON & R. FALK, supra note 56, at 31 (general public and president
both sense heightened importance of "priests" and president); R. SCHEER, supra
note 25, at 70 (ability to exclude others from the secret society creates a sense of
power).
99 M. EDELMAN, supra note 79, at 94-95 (loyalty to the group becomes the highest
form of morality, preventing groups without corrective feedback from raising social
issues); R. LIFTON & R. FALK, supra note 56, at 31-36 (nuclear powers become
either mass murderers or self-deceivers who fluctuate between feelings of omnipo-
tence and impotence); see R. SCHEER, supra note 25, at 76-79, 105 (instead of
admitting that the "window of vulnerability," like the "missile gap" of the 1960's,
was a misplaced fear, the President has pursued a policy entangled in contradictions);
Gambino, supra note 78, at 24-25 (the stock language that the government has
evolved makes questions of personal responsibility impossible to discuss, much less
evaluate); Mack, supra note 29, at 20-21 (decision makers live in a world where
reality and imagination are intertwined; they make decisions based on worst case
scenarios without even questioning underlying assumptions).
100 Molander, supra note 27.
101 Id.
102 Id.; see S. HILGARTNER, R. BELL & R. O'CONNOR, supra note 31, at 135-36
(attitude of complacency pervaded the nuclear industry and the NRC-an accident
was not a "credible event"). See generally I. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS (1972).
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II. DIFFICULTIES WITH SELF-CORRECTION
A. Censorship, Secrecy, and News Management
Communications on nuclear armaments may thus have psychological im-
pact exceeding that of most other forms of speech. The ability of weapons
talk to still or bypass rational thought processes suggests that the messages
conveyed are less likely than are other communications to be challenged
effectively in the marketplace of ideas. 10 3 As Parts III and IV suggest, this
observation is constitutionally and politically troublesome; remedial action
may be in order.
An additional group of concerns stems from the government's power to
maintain secrets and manipulate the news. The usual, and constitutionally
preferable, solution to most problems of offensive speech is not censorship,
but "more speech." 10 4 The rationale is that in the "marketplace of ideas,"
the evils of offensive speech will be exposed by responsive messages,
and the truth will emerge. 10 5 In the areas of armaments and national secur-
ity, however, the marketplace may be an uncertain means of determining
truth. The government's power to classify secrets severely hampers the
ability of a critic to marshall an effective response. The government may
classify the critic's message, preventing its dissemination entirely. 106 Alter-
103 This is not to say that government weapons talk stills all dissent. The many
critical articles and books cited in these footnotes are evidence that it does not.
Rather, the features described in Part B give a marked competitive advantage to
discourse structured in the ways described in Part A, making the task of the critic
much more difficult than it is in other areas.
104 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The
approach urged by Justices Brandeis and Holmes in Whitney and other early free
speech cases, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing), has emerged as the majority approach to the first amendment. See Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (overruling Whitney); id. at 452 (citing Holmes
dissent in Gitlow as "mov[ing] closer to the First Amendment ideal") (Douglas, J.,
concurring); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951) ("there is little doubt
that subsequent opinions have inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis rationale"). See
generally L. TRIBE, supra note 4 at 603-606.
105 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In
his dissent in Abrams, Justice Holmes gave the classic statement of "marketplace"
theory:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself tested in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitu-
tion.
Id.
106 See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
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natively, the government may simply prevent access to the data necessary to
support a contrary opinion. Both impediments undermine the effectiveness
of a "more speech" solution.
10 7
Secrecy and news management have characterized the government's ap-
proach to nuclear weapons from the beginning. This approach began with
the Manhattan Project, which was conceived and built in total secrecy.
10 8
The press in rural New Mexico learned that top-secret installations were
being built in Los Alamos, but the government forbade them to report
anything.' 0 9 The term "nuclear energy" did not appear in the American
press at all during the war years; nor did the term "uranium." 11 0 After the
first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, the U.S. government con-
107 Ordinarily, excessive or exaggerated government speech is mitigated by a
number of marketplace forces. The dangers of drowning out opposing voices are
mitigated by a vigorous press and broadcast media. See M. YUDOF, supra note 2, at
91 (suggesting that pluralism in modem communications may prevent any one view-
point from gaining ideological dominance). Federal/state separation of powers and
the existence of multiple agencies at the state and federal level fragment power to the
point at which a monopoly of ideas is difficult to achieve. Id. at 114-16. Moreover,
many citizens are skeptical of governmental claims and predisposed to view official
declarations with a grain of salt. Schauer, supra note 2, at 381. Finally, while
technology aids the government in the promulgation of its message, it also aids the
dissenter, giving him or her a forum on the evening news, on public-access programs,
and on the Op. Ed. page. Id. at 380-81.
Although each of these channels is open to the opponent of governmental nuclear
policies, their effectiveness is markedly diminished by the psycholinguistic devices
and responses described in this Article. Government speech in the area of nuclear
weaponry evokes powerful images that terrify and numb the listener, or make him or
her an insecure, compliant follower. See supra notes 79-100 and accompanying text.
The government also disables critics by news management, secrecy, classification of
data, and selective release of information that serves the government's interest. See
infra notes 108-32 and accompanying text. Cf. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d
1307, 1316 (2d Cir. 1973) (Oakes, J., dissenting) ("incredibly enough, it appears that
neither the American people nor the Congress . . . were given the facts .... Air
Force B-52 bombers were secretly attacking Cambodia in 1969, 1970 and even later
while the United States was publicly proclaiming respect for Cambodian neu-
trality."); Allen v. United States, 588 F.Supp. 247, 403 (D. Utah 1984) ("At the most
fundamental level, the Government's failure to educate, to inform, and to warn
deprived those people living in [the vicinity of nuclear test site] of an opportunity ...
to protect themselves.") (emphasis in original). Thus, the factors that ordinarily
serve to undermine the government's monopoly of ideas are themselves weakened or
negated by government efforts, or by virtue of psychological characteristics of the
debate itself.
108 See S. HILGARTNER, R. BELL & R. O'CONNOR, supra note 31, at 25-26.
109 Id. at 29, 30
110 Address by Robert Manoff, M.D., Stanford Univ. School of Medicine, at
conference sponsored by Physicians for Social Responsibility, "Prescription for
Prevention," at Stanford University, Oct. 7-8, 1983.
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trolled all press coverage of the event.'' When reporters gained admission
to Hiroshima and reported lingering deaths resulting from radiation disease,
the occupation army ordered them expelled and placed the city off limits.
Reports of radiation poisoning were denied or explained as Japanese prop-
aganda. The existence of censorship was itself censored; the press was not
permitted even to mention the limitations placed on its coverage. Medical
research and exchanges about the biological effects of nuclear\explosions
were not permitted; doctors worked among the victims of Hiroshima and
Nagasake unaware of what they were treating. Japanese citizens concluded
that radiation illness was contagious and avoided contact with the sick."12
The preoccupation with secrecy did not end with the war. Scientists who
expressed reservations about nuclear weapons research were reassigned" 13
or found their testimony blocked by executive privilege. 14 Critics found
their jobs threatened; most employees feared that by discussing safety, they
risked being fired. 115 In United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 116 defense
lawyers were prepared to introduce affidavits of leading scientists to show
that any competent physicist working from public sources could.have pre-
pared the magazine's story on how to build a nuclear bomb. The government
ordered the affidavits classified." 7 The same occurred when a critic of
nuclear energy wrote to the Department of Energy with questions about
nuclear policies and safety: the Department ordered his letter classified. 18
The present administration has, if anything, intensified the preoccupation
with secrecy and news management that has existed since the early days of
atomic power.1 9 The Reagan administration has exercised its discretion to
i Id.
112 Id.
"I S. HILGARTNER, R. BELL & R. O'CONNOR, supra note 31, at 120.
114 Id.
115 See id. at 120-21; cf. Knoll, supra note 69 (former Air Force communications
intelligence officers were warned that they violated espionage laws when they pub-
licly challenged the Reagan administration's version of the Korean Airlines incident).
116 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
117 S. HILGARTNER, R. BELL & R. O'CONNOR, supra note 31, at 68; see also
Knoll, supra note 69 (government warned newspaper chain that they could face
federal prosecution for receiving documents showing enough uranium missing to
make 85 nuclear bombs).
118 Id. at 64. Studies and reports were classified or cancelled on the ground that
they would interfere with the "public understanding." See id. at 77-78 (AEC sup-
pressed study on hazards of reactor incidents at suggestion of public relations
strategist); id. at 97 (AEC agreed to permit publication of study of fallout only after
some sections were deleted for public relations reasons).
119 See Abrams, The New Efjfrt to Control Information, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25,
1983, § G (Magazine), at 22-27; Grunewald, Trying to Censor Reality, TIME, Nov. 7,
1983, at 102; see also Emerson, The State of the First Amendment as We Enter
"1984," 2 CoM. LAW. 3 (Winter 1984).
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block public access to unclassified nuclear information. 120 Recently, the
President issued a national security directive authorizing lie detector tests to
counter leaks on sensitive subjects. 12' The administration also issued an
order subjecting present and former senior government officials to lifetime
prepublication review of any speeches or articles containing material that
might be classified. 122 The administration has excluded foreign speakers and
films with points of view that deviate from its own, and attempted to limit the
scope of the Freedom of Information Act. 123 When the National Education
Association proposed a junior high school course on nuclear arms, to be
prepared by the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Reagan administration
accused the Association of "brain-washing America's school children."1
24
At the same time that it suppresses or discourages critical messages, the
government aggressively markets its own viewpoint. The government has
offered free trips and other rewards to "loyal" journalists, 25 while creating
obstacles for those with critical views.' 26 The government also provides
120 Norman, Universities Denounce DOE's Secrecy Rules, SCIENCE, Sept. 2, 1983,
at 932.
121 Making Government Clam Up, TIME, Oct. 31, 1983, at 40; see also Samuels,
What If the Lie Detector Lies?, THE NATION, Dec. 3, 1983, at 566 (presidential
directive of Mar. 11, 1983 requiring federal employees with access to classified
information to submit to polygraph tests threatens to provide a cloak of respectability
to a procedure best described as a strip search); Loose Lips, TIME, Dec. 5, 1983, at 44
(directive permitting use of polygraph on 215,000 federal employees has not ended
information leaks and has provoked considerable discontent).
122 Abrams, supra note 119, at 23-25; Making Government Clam Up, supra note
121.
123 Abrams, supra note 119, passim; Emerson, supra note 119; Grunewald, supra
note 119; USIA Blacklisted 84from Speaking Program, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 10,
1984, § 1, at 15, col. 6. Fear of governmental retaliation allegedly caused a television
network to postpone the airing of a film concerning the effects of a thermonuclear
attack on an American city; the network had a number of license renewal petitions
pending and feared that they would be held up if it presented the film. Preston, What
Happened to TV's H-Bomb Epic?, San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle, June 5,
1983, "Scene" Section, at 9, col. I.
124 NEA Upholds Stance of Race over Seniority in Layoffs, Seattle Times, July 6,
1983, at 3, col. 3.
125 E.g., Nelson, U.S. Financed Grenada, Latin Trips of 22 Journalists, Los
Angeles Times, Nov. 14 1983, § 1, at 4, col. 1.
126 For example, when UPI named a liberal reporter from the Christian Science
Monitor to head a bureau in a strategically sensitive area, the administration exerted
pressure to have a more loyal reporter reappointed in his place. N. CHOMSKY, supra
note 56, at 199. When journalists reported nuclear developments in ways critical of
the government, they were accused of disloyalty. Knoll, supra note 69. Leslie Gelb,
former director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, wrote
recently of a U.S. contingency plan to deploy nuclear weapons in Canada, Iceland,
Bermuda, and Puerto Rico. An Administration official pressured the N.Y. Times to
suppress the story. When, in spite of these efforts, the story appeared, Lt. Col. John
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selected reports and data to reporters who, under the pressure of deadlines,
often do not have time to verify them or seek out opposing views.' 27
Government publicists attempt to reassure or frighten the public, as different
policies dictate. 12 8 On one occasion, the Secretary of Defense objected to a
publication of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "World Military
Expenditures," as overstating the size and nature of U.S. and NATO de-
fense budgets. The pressure was effective; the Agency discontinued the
reports, then resumed them, but with more statistics and tables and less
comparative analysis. 1
29
In addition to blocking criticism, secrecy augments the power of the
subconscious defense mechanisms described earlier. 30 Secrecy and denial
synergize each other. The government's use of secrecy implies that the truth
would be gruesome and terrifying; the audience is almost grateful for being
spared the frightening information.131 Secrecy can also fortify the image of
the nuclear strategist, in both his own and the public's eyes, as all-powerful
and above ordinary obligations of responsibility and honesty. Why was he




Even short of censorship and secrecy, government controls the content of
news by working with the mass media to set social agendas. According to
Chain, the current director of the Bureau, ordered Gelb's picture removed from the
wall where it had hung and forbade the Bureau staff to speak with Gelb. Lewis,
Apologize to Leslie Gelb, San Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 11, 1985, at 37, col. 5.
127 See, e.g., C. STEINBERG, tHE INFORMATION ESTABLISHMENT 38-122, 147-191
(1980); White House Computer Line to Provide 'Unfiltered' News, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 7, 1985, at A14, col. 3 (White House established press service, similar to AP and
UPI, to convey its own messages to American people); cf. Taking Aim at CBS, TIME,
Mar. i, 1985, at 53 (conservative group endorsed by Sen. Jesse Helms wants to
purchase CBS to counter liberal bias).
128 See, e.g., S. HILGARTNER, R. BELL & R. O'CONNOR, supra note 31, at 225
(discussing a 1950 paperback, How TO SURVIVE AN ATOMIC BOMB, that outlines a
series of rules designed to downplay the hazards of radiation); Conine, Loose Lips
Sink More Than Ships, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 17, 1983, § I1, at 5, col. 4 (Reagan
administration has stopped making off-the-cuff remarks that hurt its image at home or
abroad in first year of administration); see also Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp.
247, 404 (D. Utah 1984) (public pronouncements on danger to off-site residents of
fallout from nuclear tests "do not really warn .... They reassure.").
129 D. CLARKE, POLITICS OF ARMS CONTROL 136-37 (1979).
130 See supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
31 Carson, Nuclear Weapons and Secrecy, in Task Force Report, supra note 28,
at 34, 38. But see Yudkin, supra note 29, at 24 (children's fears compounded by
adult's reluctance to discuss nuclear issues with them).
132 S. HILGARTNER, R. BELL & R. O'CONNOR, supra note 31, at 58-59, 142; see
also supra notes 98, 102 and accompanying text.
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some communications scholars, the crucial characteristic of mass media is
their capacity to shape social reality by setting the agenda for public dis-
course. 133 The media may not always succeed in telling people what to think,
but they are highly successful in telling them what to think about.
134
This capacity for agenda-setting can become pernicious if the media are
subject to manipulation. Research in communications theory suggests that
when the media construct social reality, they do so according to relatively
predictable patterns.135 The news net cast by the media traps primarily big
fish; the institutional and professional values of reporters lead them to rely
heavily on legitimated institutions and high-ranking officials for their subject
matter. 13 6 The journalistic convention of objectivity ensures that the mes-
sages of institutional speakers get through relatively unscathed,' 37 thereby
reaffirming the legitimacy of those institutions and their communications.
The news net largely determines media content. 138 Government speech,
because it emanates from legitimated institutions, is likely to be caught in the
news net. Speech from unofficial sources is likely to slip through the net. The
media do report the speech of a Nobel Prize winner, or the occasional mass
demonstration against nuclear weaponry. These events are not caught be-
cause of their subject matter, but because public figures and mass gatherings
are considered intersections in the news net; they are newsworthy in their
own right. Such sporadic coverage of speech from unofficial sources cannot
match the institutionalized reporting of government sources.
The government, therefore, plays an important role in determining media
content and thus in setting the agenda for public discourse. As has been
1 See McCombs & Shaw, The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media, 36 PUB.
OPINION Q. 176, 177 (1972) (mass media set agenda by influencing attitudes toward
issues); see generally D. GRABER, supra note 31; D. SHAW & M. MCCOMBS, THE
EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL ISSUES: THE AGENDA-SETTING FUNCTION OF
THE PRESS (1977).
134 See B. COHEN, THE PRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY 13 (1963) (the press "may not
be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is strongly
successful in telling its readers what to think about") (emphasis in original);
McCombs & Shaw, The Agenda-Setting Function of the Press, in D. SHAW &
MCCOMBS, supra note 133, at 4-8 (1977) (discussing effects of agenda-setting); Shaw
& Clemmer, News and the Public Response, in D. SHAW & M. MCCOMBS, supra
note 133, at 46-49 (findings of study indicating effectiveness of agenda-setting); see
also H. GANS, DECIDING WHAT'S NEWS 297-98 (1979) (discussing role of press as
"constructors of nation and society").
135 See H. GANS, supra note 134, at 5, passim; cf. Shaw & Clemmer, supra note
134, at 34-40 (suggesting that media generally agree on what issues to be reported).
136 See H. GANS, supra note 134, at 8-13 (approximately 80% of news reports
focus on "known" figures); 281-84 (most reports deal with speech and activity of
prominent public figures and institutions).
137 See id. at 182-213 (discussing roles of objectivity, values, and ideology in
reporting).
138 See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
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seen, government speech on nuclear matters is often distorted or euphemis-
tic, and frequently untruthful.' 3 9 Yet the agenda-setting hypothesis suggests
that such slanted communications will nevertheless have a profound effect
on the way people think about nuclear matters.' 40 If this effect occurs, the
government may succeed in controlling attitudes and behaviors with respect
to nuclear weapons simply because it dictates the terms of debate. An
individual may have an intuitive revulsion toward nuclearism, for example,
but be unable to articulate opposition; the language and structure of the
debate may render such beliefs unsayable. 141
Communications theory, then, further explains the means through which
government speech on nuclear arms achieves dominance. When the gov-
ernment's own powers of secrecy and news management are added to the
equation, government speech not only shapes the contours of the debate, but
also renders opposition ineffectual. It is therefore critical that government
communications dealing with nuclear weaponry and policy be held to the
highest standards of probity. The next two sections examine whether this
objective can be accomplished consistently with the first amendment.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF GOVERNMENTAL SPEECH ON NUCLEAR
WEAPONRY
In the American political system, government relies for its legitimacy on
the consent of the governed. 142 We are committed, at least in theory, to a
political system in which vital decisions are made through a collective
examination that probes the tensions, contradictions, and alternatives inher-
ent in our life together. 43 Any serious impairment of this process under-
mines a principal mechanism by which democratic government functions.
Although all governments use language to some extent to enhance their own
119 See supra notes 21-77 and accompanying text.
140 See supra notes 127, 133-34 and accompanying text.
141 See Pocock, supra note 79, at 27 (those whose language is controlled com-
municate only through meanings dictated by others); Schlesinger, supra note 79, at
557 (language shapes development of ideas); Tushnet, supra note 78, at 134-44
(discussing impact of governmental communications on public).
142 Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also C. FRANKEL, THE
DEMOCRATIC PROSPECT 34 (1962) (government by consent expresses the hope that
ordinary people can influence the actions of their leaders); Lipsky, Introduction, in
M. EDELMAN, supra note 79, at xviii-xx (while pluralists see a high participation rate
as a sign of health, low participation can mean either mass satisfaction or despair and
suppression); Carson, Nuclear Weapons and Secrecy, in Task Force Report, supra
note 28, at 34, 40.
143 White, The Ethics of Argument: Plato's Gorgias and the Modern Lawyer, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 849, 894-95 (1983).
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authority, 144 this practice seems more exaggerated, and more pernicious, in
connection with the arms race than it does in other contexts.
145
These considerations suggest that some measures to limit government
dishonesty concerning armaments should be considered. A principal
difficulty for any such effort is the traditional deference our society gives to
free speech values. This Part, accordingly, examines the extent of protection
due government weapons speech. Part IV discusses remedies that may be
applied when such speech goes beyond acceptable bounds and limitations on
such remedies.
A. Does The First Amendment Require a Remedy?
A few commentators have suggested that certain types of government
speech violate the first amendment and affirmatively call for a remedy.
146
One commentator boldly asserts that government speech in support of
controversial political premises offends an implied establishment clause in
the first amendment. 47 Although he draws analogous support from case
law, 148 no court has adopted his theory directly. 49 Were courts to adopt an
144 See generally D. GRABER supra note 31; N. CHOMSKY, supra note 56, at 5-6.
141 Quantitative data are hard to come by, but the proposition seems intuitively
plausible. See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text (heavy government spend-
ing for publicity in support of nuclear policies); infra notes 177-78 and accompanying
text (probable falsification of consent); supra notes 10-28 and accompanying text
(current nuclear situation and risk of war); supra notes 31-77 and accompanying text
(devices used by government to promote nuclear policies); supra notes 82-91 and
accompanying text (psychological response mechanisms); supra notes 104-32 and
accompanying text (obstacles to sef-correction). Certainly, government speech with
respect to nuclear weaponry and policy is no less troublesome than other types of
speech that have aroused concern. See infra note 178.
146 E.g., M. YUDOF, supra note 2, at 165, 238-40; Kamenshine, supra note 2,
passim; Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Expres-
sion and the First Amendment, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 863, 871-72, 897-906 (1979).
""7 Kamenshine, supra note 2, at 1104-11.
148 Id. at 1119-24. Professor Kamenshine relies almost entirely on an analogy to
cases arising under the religious establishment clause. He also relies in part on the
cases striking down indirect government aid to private speech, such as Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977). He uses the latter, however, not as
precedent for an establishment clause, but rather to suggest their inadequacy in
protecting first amendment interests. Id. at 1107-09. Nevertheless, such cases, al-
though based on the impairment of self-expression, may tacitly support the proposi-
tion that government may not engage in certain forms of speech, regardless of the
impact on individual self-expression.
149 At least one case, decided by the First Circuit, suggests the possibility that
certain forms of government speech may be constitutionally offensive. Bonner-
Lyons v. School Comm., 480 F.2d 442 (1st Cir. 1973). In Bonner-Lyons, the court
drew support from the open forum cases, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley,
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establishment clause approach, however, government speech on nuclear
arms would be a good candidate for unconstitutionality. The types of public-
ity and news control described earlier pose all the principal dangers that
government speech analysis seeks to avert: they promote controversial
political premises, 150 enforce orthodoxy,' 15 and threaten to drown out op-
posing voices and views.
5 2
A second set of considerations suggesting that government arms-race
talk is unconstitutional stems from doctrines dealing with censorship and the
rights of captive audiences. Ordinarily, these doctrines apply in quite differ-
ent factual circumstances and have opposite effects. The first amendment
forbids government censorship of private speech. Censorship is offensive
because it silences communications that the people might wish to hear and
establishes government as the judge of what shall be heard. 5 3 Captive
audience doctrine, by contrast, allows, and perhaps mandates, government
interference with private speech.- 4 In the case of government speech on
nuclear arms, however, these paths converge. The government's use of
psycholinguistic devices to manipulate the people on nuclear issues, coupled
with its ability to control information, presents the dangers of imposed
408 U.S. 92 (1972), in forbidding the Boston School Committee from using public
facilities "to support a particular viewpoint." 480 F.2d at 444. The remedy in
Bonner-Lyons was an injunction against any further speech by the School Committee
unless the Committee made the same channels of speech available to those holding
differing views. See also Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 872 (1982): "school
boards may not remove books from school library shelves simply because they
dislike the ideas contained in those books and seek by their removal 'to prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion'
(quoting West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
150 See Kamenshine, supra note 2, at 1113-15 (government speech in support of
controversial matters of partisan politics violates implied establishment clause of first
amendment).
's' See supra notes 103-41 and accompanying text; infra notes 173-82 and accom-
panying text.
152 See infra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
113 E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); West Virginia
State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); Lovel v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,
451 (1938); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissent-
ing); see also 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 1880-92 (5th ed. 1891) (liberty of the press); J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY Ch.
11 (1859) (Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion).
154 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (Douglas, J.
concurring) (commuters on municipal buses deemed captive audiences for messages
transmitted on bus); Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1980) (inmates
may not be subjected to forced religious doctrination); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F.
Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass. 1970) (school systems may restrict secondary school
teachers to acceptable teaching methods). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at
678 n. 18.
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orthodoxy; 155 such speech can become the functional equivalent of censor-
ship. Similar considerations apply in the case of the trapped-audience com-
parison. The listener is bombarded with one-sided, terrifying messages on
nuclear weaponry, with little opportunity to escape them. 15 6 Both consid-
erations argue for controls.
Considerations of constitutional structure supply a further ground for
limiting government speech of the types described in this article." 57 The
governmental model laid out in the Constitution is a form of representative
and participatory democracy. 5 8 The first amendment reflects the judgment
of the Framers that free trade in ideas is essential both to effective participa-
tion and to emergence of the ultimate good. 159 The first amendment, there-
fore, "embodies more than a commitment to free expression and com-
municative interchange for their own sakes; it has a structural role to play in




The structural argument suggests that the first amendment guarantees not
only the right to communicate, but also the right to the information and
means necessary to communicate effectively. If, however, the government
is permitted to curtail the flow of information necessary to effective speech,
the structural role of the first amendment is undermined. When the govern-
ment goes further, itself using powerful, distorted speech that may effec-
tively render the listener incapable of meaningful response, it threatens
impairment of popular participation in the political arena. 16' Protection of
our form of constitutional government, then, requires that government
speech on nuclear arms, which has the potential effect of stilling intelligent
response, be subject to restraint.
155 See supra notes 63-64, 80-81, 101-02, 130-32 and accompanying text.
156 See supra notes 31-141 and accompanying text.
157 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587-88 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (postulating a structural role of the first amendment-as
guarantee that public debate on important issues be informed); M. YUDOF, supra
note 2, at 158-73 (arguments from history and structure); see also Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) ("Underlying the First Amendment
right of access to criminal trials is the common understanding that 'a major purpose
of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.' ")
(quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
158 U.S. CONST. art. §§ 1-4; id. amends. 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 24.
1 59 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREE-
DOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1965); Brennan, The Supreme
Court and the Meiklehohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1965).
160 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587-88 (1980) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
161 See supra notes 36-132 and accompanying text.
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These three sets of considerations suggest that unremitting government
weapons talk may constitute, in itself, a violation of the first amendment. If
so, remedies would be not merely permissible but affirmatively compelled;
the only restraints would be political. The evils of government speech can
be remedied by a less drastic route, however by a finding that govern-
ment speech is not per se unconstitutional, but nevertheless regulable.
9
B. Does the First Amendment Permit a Remedy?
1. Analytical Approaches
A sizable body of government-speech commentary argues that official
speech, if not affirmatively violative of the first amendment, is at least
regulable consistently with that amendment. 61 Courts are more likely to
adopt this latter position; it is less radical doctrinally, and poses fewer
enforcement difficulties than the approach under which official speech js
found affirmatively unconstitutional. The remainder of this article therefore
evaluates weapons speech from this perspective.
Two analytical routes converge on the conclusion that government speech
of certain types is constitutionally regulable. The first asserts that govern-
ment, qua government, has no first amendment right to speak. The second
holds that government may have some such right, but this right may be
restricted on a lesser showing of necessity than that applicable to private
speech.
The case for nonprotection was first made more than 200 years ago. James
Madison wrote that government speech stood on a different footing from
private speech, was a potential threat to representative democracy, and
could be limited or censored as the people wished. 163 His argument, albeit in
less sweeping form, has been echoed by a number of current commentators,
most notably Mark Yudof.164 Yudof asserts that government speech poses
special dangers and was not intended by the Framers to receive constitu-
tional protection. He urges, however, that as a matter of policy only some,
162 M. YUDOF, supra note 2, at 200-07 (advocating indirect application of the first
amendment to foster pluralism and vindicate traditional free speech rights); Shiffrin,
supra note 2, at 609-12 (suggesting an eclectic approach drawing on a- variety of
differing models to balance values restricting government speech against legitimate
government interests in communication); Ziegler, supra note 2, at 598-600, 604
(asserting the need for comprehensive legislation to prohibit partisanship in public
agencies); see also Yudof, supra note 146, at 912-17 (proposing the technique of
judicial remand to the legislature, similar to the technique used with the dormant
commerce clause, to control questionable government speech).
163 "If we advert to the nature of Republican Government, we shall find that the
censorial power is in the people over the government, and not in the government over
the people." Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 532 n.5 (quoting 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934
(1774)).
164 M. YUDOF, supra note 2; Yudof, supra note 146.
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not all, government speech be closely regulated. 165 Much that government
wishes to say is harmless or is necessary for effective government func-
tioning. For example, government needs to educate, to promote industry
and commerce, and to marshall support for its policies.
66
Particular types of government speech are problematical, however. For
example, the commentators agree that government has no business expend-
ing public resources on speech aimed at reelecting itself, 167 or at creating, as
opposed to effectuating, consensus. 168 Similarly, government speech that is
untruthful or misleading has little claim to protection. 169 It has also been
suggested that government speech that is so powerful as to "drown out"
smaller voices, and thus coerce orthodoxy, should be toned down.
170
Other commentators seem to concede that the government does have
some right to speak, but reason that government speech is entitled to less
protection than most private speech. 17' These writers raise virtually the
165 M. YUDOF, supra note 2, at 42-50 (the power to facilitate and enlarge public
discussion also creates the threat of domination and distortion of majoritarian pro-
cesses); Yudof, supra note 146, at 867-72 (first amendment control of government
speech should be based on the right of the people to information rather than on the
right of government to speak).
166 M. YUDOF, supra note 2, at 38-42; Yudof, supra note 146, at 865-67. Govern-
ment also should, arguably, be able to propose policy and engage in dialogue with
citizens about the formation of policy.
The principal case cited for the proposition that government (particularly federal)
speech is not protected by the Constitution-at least to the full extent-is City of
Boston v. Anderson, 439 U.S. 1060 (1979) (dismissing for want of a substantial
federal question an appeal from state decision enjoining municipal advocacy). Not all
rights under the Constitution are assertable by government. E.g., Williams v. Mayor
of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933). Commentators who take the view that the
government does not have full rights of free speech argue that the first amendment
was intended as a limitation on government's power to silence the people, and not as
a source of government power to speak. See supra note 163.
167 T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 699 (1970); M.
YUDOF, supra note 2, at 8-9; Shiffrin, supra note 2, at 612-40; see also United States
Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
557 (1973) (upholding limitations on political activities of federal employees).
168 M. YUDOF, supra note 2, at 15, 31-37, 152-57; Kamenshine, supra note 2, at
1110.
169 E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
170 2 Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATION 723, 796 (1947); L.
TRIBE, supra note 4, at 590; M. YUDOF, supra note 2, at 17, 20-37, 71-110, 155-58;
Kamenshine, supra note 2, at 1110; Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 533. But cf.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (limitations on private expenditures
for election campaign held unconstitutional); Schauer, supra note 2, at 381-85 (gov-
ernment speech generally does not "drown out" private speech and hence is not a
first amendment problem).
171 E.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 2; Ziegler, supra note 2.
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same arguments as the no-protection school: official speech is peripheral to
core first amendment values, was not intended by the Framers to receive
protection, and poses dangers for representative democracy. These consid-
erations lead to the conclusion that government speech occupies a middle
position in the hierarchy of first amendment values-comparable perhaps to
the status of commercial speech.
172
The no-protection school and the lesser-protection school come to similar
conclusions: government speech may be regulated on a lesser showing of
need than that required for other categories of speech. The considerations
that lead each school to this conclusion are also similar. Accordingly, the
remainder of this section examines these concerns and the extent to which
they arise in government speech on nuclear weaponry.
2. Dangers of Government Speech
The dangers that government speech theorists identify as justifying special
treatment of official speech center around subversion of first amendment
values. These values fall into two groups: extrinsic values, mainly those
concerned with the role of speech in democratic government; and intrinsic
values of self-expression and self-realization.
(a) "Drowning out," falsification of consent, and self-perpetuation. Con-
cerns related to the drowning out of private voices, and to the monopoly on
ideas that results, are easily and compellingly substantiated in the area under
examination. The government devotes substantial resources to promoting its
own viewpoints, especially with respect to defense policy. Although the
actual figures are difficult to ascertain, the Pentagon probably spends more
money spreading its message than all opposing private speakers com-
bined.1 73 In addition, the government can count on the publicity efforts of
defense contractors, whose viewpoint generally coincides with its own.
174
The result is a flood of reports, releases, films, commercials, and press
conferences all promoting a single viewpoint. 75- Faced with this publicity
barrage, opposing voices operate at a marked disadvantage.
176
172 Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 604-17; Ziegler, supra note 2, at 531-36.
173 E.g., M. YUDOF, supra note 2, at 7, 56-58, 61-66, 78, 122-23; J. FULBRIGHT,
THE PENTAGON PROPAGANDA MACHINE (1970); Kosterlitz, The Money Behind the
MX, COMMON CAUSE, Mar./Apr. 1985, at 15.
174 See Anderson, Pentagon and Public Relations, San Francisco Chronicle, July
20, 1984, at 69, col. 1 (criticizing Pentagon's willingness to condone defense contrac-
tors' charging taxpayers for public relations expenditures); see also Kosterlitz, supra
note 173, at 15-18 (defense contractors lobbied hard for MX missile).
175 See sources cited supra note 173. See generally A. WINKLER, THE POLITICS OF
PROPAGANDA: THE OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION (1978).
176 Thus, although private speech may not have been "drowned out" in a literal
sense, it operates at a marked disadvantage vis-a-vis government speech. The disad-
vantage is accentuated by government efforts to manage news, hector and silence
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The imbalance between government's powerful voice, magnified by com-
munications technology, and less powerful private voices can result in
falsification of consent. According to government-speech theorists, falsifica-
tion of consent problems arise when government uses speech, not to effectu-
ate the will of the people, but to manufacture that will without popular
consent or conscious participation. 177 The manipulative strategies described
earlier plainly have the potential to falsify consent, and probably have
already done so to a considerable extent. 178 The combination of loaded
messages, news manipulation, and arcane technical language, all of which
trigger subconscious defense mechanisms that disable effective response,
presents unique dangers for a political system based on consent: it under-
mines the processes by which the citizenry exercise political choice at the
same time that it decreases their range of choices and dictates the terms in
which those choices are understood. 
17 9
For the same reasons, government speech on nuclear arms also presents
dangers of self-perpetuation. As early as 1961, President Eisenhower warned
of the dangers to democracy posed by a growing alliance between the
military and government that would work to maintain a constant state of
military readiness, high expenditures for the armed forces, and foreign
policy shaped by military concerns. 180 To some extent, Eisenhower's pre-
dictions have come true. The exigencies of the world situation may explain
this phenomenon, at least in part. But the continued existence of a govern-
critics, and present the opposition as uninformed or neurotic. See supra notes 119-30
and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 31-77 and accompanying text. One obvious exception is the
case of children, who may be subjected to the teaching of civic and other values in
public school.
178 See supra notes 29-31, 78-102 and accompanying text (psychological effect of
arms messages); cf. M. YUDOF, supra note 2, at 20-37, 71-110 (extensive review of
cybernetics, communications theory, and political science literature, concluding that
government speech, in general, has the capacity to affect choice and falsify consent).
The threatening, highly emotion-laden language discussed in this Article seems
even more likely to have these effects than ordinary government speech. Yudof
writes that the efficacy of government speech is tempered by a number of factors: a
vigorous private media, the existence of multiple branches and agencies, and an
attitude of skepticism toward government speech. See supra note 107. In the case of
nuclear weapons speech, however, these corrective forces are greatly weakened. See
supra notes 29-31, 78-102 and accompanying text (psychological effect of arms
messages); see also supra notes 104-141 and accompanying text (difficulties with
self-correction).
179 See N. CHOMSKY, supra note 56, at 101-02; M. YUDOF, supra note 2, at 20-37,
71-110; Schlesinger, supra note 79, at 553, 557; see also M. EDELMAN, supra note 96,
at 21, 23-41; S. HILGARTNER, R. BELL & R. O'CONNOR, supra note 31, at xiii-xiv.
180 Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People, reprinted in
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Item 421, at 1038
(Jan. 17, 1961).
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ment attuned to military concerns may result equally from conscious prop-
aganda and information control efforts by the military-industrial complex. 81
Government speech aimed at such self-perpetuation has little claim for first
amendment protection.
182
(b) Nonpolitical values. Curtailing government weapons speech would
also serve certain nonpolitical, or intrinsic, first amendment values. On an
individual level, freedom of expression promotes personal development. 183
At a societal level, it serves a role in creating the social world. 84 Through
speech, individuals express and define themselves. Societies, too, create the
world as they talk about it.185 Thus, speech restrictions, 8 6 excessively
domineering speech, 187 or speech that dictates the terms of debate,, 88 all
reduce the scope of creative conversation. In so doing, they arbitrarily
reduce the realm of the possible. Individuals may wish to actualize them-
selves by advocating new approaches to the nuclear dilemma; society may
wish to engage in conversation about the same issues. To the extent that
government weapons speech impairs these possibilities, individuals and
society are diminished.
3. Summary: Concerns Supporting Regulation
The above discussion suggests that government speech on nuclear
weapons should be regulable, either as a matter of constitutional necessity or
social policy, when all or many of the following concerns are present:
(a) Concerns dealing with falsification of consent. The government
speech is unremitting, monolithic, and accompanied by measures, such as
secrecy and news management, that eliminate competition. The speech is
81 See supra notes 31-102 and accompanying text.
182 In applying the self-perpetuation model, scope would have to be allowed for
advocacy during political campaigns and also for presidential communications neces-
sary to the conduct of foreign policy and affairs. In either context, military advocacy
(like its opposite--disarmament or pacifism) would be proper. One practical problem
with this model is the difficulty of deciding when government speech has moved
outside these regions.
183 E.g., Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877, 879-80 (1963) (freedom of expression derives from the widely accepted
premise of western thought that the proper goal is to realize each individual's
potential as a human being).
184 Chevigny, Philosophy of Language and Free Expression, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV.
157, 176-77 (1980) (words, whether expressing norms, values, or scientific facts, have
meaning for society only when presented in a context determined by discourse).
185 Id. at 163-76.
186 See supra notes 103-141 and accompanying text (secrecy, censorship, and
news manipulation).
187 See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text (danger of "drowning out").
188 See supra notes 78-79, 133-141 and accompanying text (dictating terms of
debate; agenda-setting).
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calculated to trigger unconscious response mechanisms. The effect of the
communication is to limit, not broaden, citizens' powers of choice on nu-
clear issues.
(b) Concerns dealing with self-perpetuation. The speech threatens per-
petuation of government based on military spending and values.
(c) Concerns related to "drowning out."' The speech is persistent and
powerful; other voices have little opportunity to be heard.
(d) Concerns based on parallels to trapped audiences and censorship.
The audience has no effective means of escaping the speech and internaliz-
ing the message it conveys. The speech institutionalizes orthodoxy.
(e) Concerns based on nonmarketplace values. The speech devalues the
autonomy of the listener and society and limits opportunities for growth or
experimentation.
The items on this checklist should apply cumulatively. When many of the
concerns are present, courts and legislatures should act to moderate the
threat to democratic decisionmaking. When few are present, the case for
intervention weakens. The identity and rank of the speaker, as well as the
context of the communication, are also relevant; for example, they may be
factors in the determination that certain speech is self-serving and aimed at
personal or institutional aggrandizement.
89
IV. FRAMING A REMEDY
Much government speech on nuclear issues presents the dangers sum-
marized above. Remedies designed to prevent these dangers should thus be
constitutionally permissible. Any remedy should be narrowly tailored to
avoid undue interference with legitimate government functions and con-
cerns. In crafting the remedy, Congress and the courts should also consider
political and institutional feasibility. Three basic types of approach are
possible: judicial, legislative and shared. Because of the difficulty of the
problem, and the delicacy and flexibility demanded of the solution, it seems
probable that a combination of the three will be necessary.
A. Judicial Remedies
Judicial remedies would attempt to cure the problems of government
weapons speech without the aid of express legislation. Such approaches
could be either direct or indirect. Direct approaches would be possible
189 For example, government agents (particularly lower-level ones) speaking in
their private capacities-i.e., as citizens rather than governmental representatives of
the government-should not be subject to regulation. See infra note 202 and accom-
panying text. Ostensibly factual speech timed to coincide with an election campaign
or congressional vote on military spending, on the other hand, should be viewed with
greater suspicion than messages delivered at other times. See supra notes 179-82 and
accompanying text (danger of governmental self-perpetuation).
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should the Supreme Court find certain types of government speech directly
violative of the first amendment.1 90 The remedy would take the form of an
injunction against further violations. It seems unlikely, however, that the
courts will conclude that government speech directly violates the first
amendment; much the same result could be achieved, without such radical
doctrinal change, simply by finding it regulable.' 91
Indirect judicial remedies would not deal head-on with the evils of nuclear
propaganda. Instead, these remedies would attempt to strengthen mecha-
nisms that enhance citizens' exercise of independent choice. Thus, courts
could broaden and strengthen such doctrines as academic freedom and
reporters' privilege. 192 They could give narrow construction to rules pertain-
ing to secrecy and executive privilege, and could resolve FOIA cases in
favor of access.' 93 They could uphold, in the face of challenges, grade school
and high school courses dealing with nuclear issues. 194 Courts could also
continue to mandate open forums, wherever the government is using a forum
to promulgate only one perspective on nuclear arms. 19 These approaches
would lessen government's near-monopoly on nuclear issues and assure that
a fairer marketplace of ideas existed.
In contrast to direct judicial approaches, this indirect approach seems
quite feasible. The courts would not make significant doctrinal changes;
rather, they would adapt existing doctrine to new conditions. The judicial
role would also be relatively nonconfrontational toward other branches of
government. Thus, indirect judicial remedies would be both institutionally
feasible and politically acceptable. As the examples above suggest, how-
ever, these remedies would also be quite limited, both in scope and effect.
Alone, they could not solve the problem of offensive government speech on
nuclear arms.
B. Legislative Remedies
Legislative remedies could also be direct or indirect. Indirect remedies
would take the form of ad hoc sanctions against the offending branch or
agency. Such remedies would not be unprecedented; Congress has on sev-
eral occasions responded to overzealous communications activities of gov-
ernment agencies by abolishing public-relations offices, cutting appropria-
tions, or influencing the selection of personnel. 196 There is no reason why
190 See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
191 See supra text following note 161.
192 See M. YUDOF, supra note 2, at 213-33, 246-58.
193 See id. at 213-58.
194 See id.at 213-33.
195 C] Bonner-Lyons v. School Comm., 480 F.2d 442, 444 (1st Cir. 1973); see
supra note 149 (discussing Bonner-Lyons and other open forum cases).
196 M. YUDOF, supra note 2, at 185.
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Congress could not use the same means to curb improper speech on nuclear
weaponry. 1
97
Congress could also use direct approaches, such as a federal statute
(designated, perhaps, The Truth in Governmental Communications on Ar-
maments Act) directing the Executive branch to communicate truthfully and
fully to Congress on all matters connected with nuclear weaponry. Specific
psycholinguistic devices, such as euphemism, scare-words, and misleading
metaphors could be illustrated and forbidden. 198 There is some precedent for
such a statute in perjury laws1 99 and other information-forcing legislation 0 0
A more ambitious approach would extend the requirement of candor to
government communications to the people at large on nuclear arms. Argu-
ably, restrictions on government speech to the public are more defensible
than restrictions on communications addressed to Congress; members of
197 It might be argued that Congress is a poor choice for the job of limiting nuclear
propaganda because Congress itself is part of the military-industrial complex. Still,
Congress has an interest in curbing excessive military expenditures, so that the
money can be spent on domestic programs that more directly benefit its constituents.
Moreover, Congress, compared to the Executive branch, engages relatively infre-
quently in public relations or propaganda; nor does it speak with a single voice. See
M. YUDOF, supra note 2, at 181. Congress also has a tradition of suspicion toward
Executive branch propaganda. See infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
Congress thus seems institutionally well suited for the job of restraining Executive
branch weapons talk.
198 As with any such effort, a statute like the one proposed would encounter
line-drawing problems. See Friedrich, supra note 36, at 76 (linguistic sin lies in eye of
beholder-"One nation's freedom fighter is another nation's terrorist"). The line-
drawing problem should not end the search for a solution. Our legal system has opted
for a system of simply stated rules, trading a certain amount of uncertainty at the
fringes for moral clarity at the center of the regions in which rules operate. It should
be no different with legislation controlling government speech. The difficulty of
deciding whether the mildly euphemistic "silo" is an impermissible term forfixed,
underground launcher of thermonuclear missiles is worth incurring, as a
euphemism-barring statute would control plainly impermissible uses of words like
those illustrated in Part I of this Article. Supra notes 31-55 and accompanying text.
Moreover, many current statutes and regulations proscribe "misleading" advertising
and corporate statements, generally leaving the term undefined. The only difference
between those contexts and government weapons speech is that the former involve
protected speech, while the speech involved in the latter is unprotected, or at least
not highly protected.
199 18 U.S.C. §§ 1622, 6002 (1982); 50 U.S.C. 792 (1982).
200 For example, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-61 (1982), requires that certain proposals and reports affecting the environ-
ment be accompanied by an environmental impact statement. Id. § 4332(2)(C). The
Arms Control and Disarmament Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2551-90 (1982), requires that
programs of research, developing, testing, and employment of weapons be preceded
by the filing of a statement of their impact on arms control and disarmament policy.
Id. § 2576(a)(1).
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Congress may be better informed and less susceptible to manipulation than
the average citizen. 20 1 Some precedent for this approach exists in the form of
a few federal statutes forbidding government agencies from communicat-
ing to the people in certain ways.
20 2
201 See False Promises: Doubts About Salvador Aid, TIME, Feb. 25, 1985, at 21
(bipartisan congressional group published a 65 page report refuting Administration
claim that three-fourths of aid sent to El Salvador was allotted for social and
economic problems).
202 For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1913 (1982), criminalizes the expenditure of agency
appropriations for the purpose of influencing the vote on bills pending before Con-
gress; the 1984 Continuing Resolution, P.L. 98-151, 97 Stat. 964, 973 (Nov. 14, 1983),
forbids the Department of Justice and FTC from using any part of their appropria-
tions for any activity, the purpose of which is to overturn or alter prohibitions on
resale price maintenance under the antitrust laws. See also 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1982)
(public TV and radio may not support or oppose candidates for office); 22 U.S.C.
1461 (1982) (U.S. Information Agency may not release for domestic broadcast
material made for foreign audiences); 39 U.S.C. § 3210(a)(5)(A) & (C) (1982) (mem-
bers of Congress may not use franking privilege to send self-laudatory or electioneer-
ing mail).
On the agency level, the FTC prohibits false and misleading advertising; the SEC
prohibits deceptive statements in connection with corporate reports and statements.
C' Medicare Must Write Letters in Plain English, San Francisco Chronicle, July 12,
1984, at 12, col. 1 (federal judge found letters sent to Medicare recipients "incom-
prehensible" and "misleading;" ordered letters rewritten in simple English).
Legislation of any of the types proposed in this Part would be enforced by suits,
generally brought in federal court. The prospect of such suits raises two problems not
raised by the remedies discussed to this point: delay and separation of powers. The
problem of delay could be solved by providing for an expedited hearing on a
governmental communication to enable corrective action before the harm occurs.
Alternatively, Congress could create a watchdog agency, like the General Account-
ing Office, to monitor governmental communications-much as the FTC monitors
commercial corporate communications. This agency could be empowered to pub-
licize and unravel official prevarication, issue a countervailing communication, or
simply report the prevarication to Congress. Although such an agency raises the
spectre of an Orwellian "truth squad," if its functions were confined to instances of
serious dissembling, it would probably survive criticism. See A State Agency's
Anti-Nuclear War Film, San Francisco Chronicle, March 29, 1984, at 61, col. 6,
reporting the decision of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health to air a
television commercial on "what could be the 'last epidemic'-nuclear war." The
commercial, which was described as "nonpolitical," was distributed free to TV
stations in the state. Cf. Humbug Patrol, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 25, 1974, at 108 (describ-
ing Nat'l Council of Teachers of English Committee on Public Doublespeak).
The second problem concerns the extent of protection due to communications
from the President or other high-level executive officers. These separation-of-power
questions are discussed infra, at notes 205-32 and accompanying text.
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C. Shared Remedy
The final type of remedy blends judicial and nonjudicial approaches. In
this approach courts would, on their own, identify categories of government
propaganda and information control that most threaten democratic val-
ues. 20 3 The categories set out in Part I might serve as a starting point for such
a list.204 Within these categories, courts would insist on express agency
approval for each communication. In the absence of such approval, the
courts would declare the communication unlawful. By means of such "re-
mands," courts could ensure open and advertent decisions on the dissemina-
tion of speech that threatens processes of representative government. This
approach allows the courts to attack problems of government excesses
directly, rather than indirectly, and also to invite explicit consideration by
government agencies of some of the problems posed by their own speech.
D. Separation of Powers
Remedies in which one branch of government coerces another to take or
refrain from action raise issues of separation of powers. Separation of
powers, along with related doctrines such as political question and executive
privilege, generally ensure that the three branches of government do not
overstep their bounds and interfere with each other's proper functions.
205 It
203 See Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976)
(Director of Parks and Recreation had no warrant, statutory or otherwise, to spend
public funds to promote a parks bond measure); see also M. YUDOF, supra note 146,
at 913 (discussing an ultra vires approach to the general problem of government
speech).
Yudof concludes that an ultra vires approach would be open to a number of
objections: (i) courts might use it to increase their power over other branches of
government; (ii) courts themselves traditionally engage in rhetoric and persuasion
and thus might not be well situated to call others to account for their sins; and (iii)
judicial intervention, even of the relatively mild sort contemplated by the shared
model, would run the risk of interfering with legitimate government speech, see
supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text. Yudof, supra note 146, at 913. None of
these objections seems very forceful when applied to remedies for abusive weapons
talk. There is little danger of judicial aggrandizement; the courts are not currently
engaged in a tug-of-war with other branches of government over nuclear policy.
Further, the defects of current arms speech noted in this Article seem glaring; they go
far beyond the occasional excess of a strongly worded judicial opinion. Finally, there
seems little risk that accepting such a role will lead courts to invalidate government
expression needed to educate children, promote commerce, or carry out any other
legitimate function of government. Consequently, the shared model appears to be a
reasonable approach to controlling government arms speech.
204 See supra notes 31-77 and accompanying text (linguistic devices); supra notes
78-102 and accompanying text (psychological mechanisms).
205 L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 15, 157-58.
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might be urged that direct remedies, by which the judiciary or Congress
orders the executive branch to discontinue deceptive talk about armaments,
violate this constitutional principle. Similarly, although the indirect remedies
suggested in sections A and B might not be unconstitutional, they may
nevertheless be assailed as imprudent on quasi-constitutional grounds. The
remainder of this sections examines the impact of separation of powers
principles on the remedies proposed above.
20 6
Rules limiting weapons speech could, arguably, interfere with the national
defense 20 7 and foreign relations20 8 functions of the executive branch. In
these areas, the Constitution gives the President broad authority. Article I1,
section 2 provides that the President shall serve as commander in chief of the
armed forces.20 9 This power arguably encompasses communicating to the
nation about military matters, including nuclear arms and strategy. The
President's military powers, however, are shared with Congress, which
controls the appropriations process through its authority "to raise and
support Armies" and "to provide and maintain a Navy." Congress is also
empowered "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation" of the
armed forces, and "to provide for calling forth the Militia to ... repel
Invasions." 210 It also has sole authority to declare war, 2 1' a power recently
reaffirmed and made specific by the War Powers Resolution of 1973,212
which limits presidential power to deploy troops abroad.2 1 3 Article I, section
8 of the Constitution imposes a further curb on presidential authority,
limiting military appropriations to a two-year period.
21 4
Presidential authority with respect to military matters is thus limited.
These limits are drawn even more tightly when the President seeks to act
domestically in furtherance of international military policy. In the Steel
Seizure Case,2 15 President Truman tried to seize and operate the nation's
steel mills to avert strikes and assure an adequate supply of steel for the
Korean War. The Supreme Court ruled his action an unconstitutional usur-
pation of legislative authority.
21 6
206 The following discussion of executive powers is patterned after L. TRIBE,
supra note 4, ch. 4 (Federal Executive Power), at 157-223.
207 U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 4, § 4-6, at
172-81.
218 See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 4, § 4-5, at 163-67.
2019 U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2.
210 Id. art. 11, § 8.
211 Id. art. 11, § 8, cl. 11.
212 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1982).
213 Id.
214 U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8 cl.
215 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
216 Id. at 587. From this, Tribe draws the conclusion that the President's role as
Commander-in-Chief affords him only a diminished scope for domestic action. L.
TRIBE, supra note 4, at 174-84.
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The President's military authority is further limited in areas where Con-
gress articulates an intention to limit Presidential power. In such areas,
which might include publicity and communications on nuclear matters, the
Presidential power "is at its lowest ebb.'' 217 Congress might plausibly assert
an interest in accurate depiction, to both Congress and the people, of the
current military situation. Shared information is a prerequisite for the exer-
cise of Congress's shared power in military matters. The people need truth-
ful information, as well, to form opinions on matters of war, peace, and
weaponry, and to communicate these opinions to their elected representa-
tives.
Similar limits exist with respect to the conduct of foreign affairs. Although
the President has traditionally been accorded wide latitude in matters of
diplomacy, 21 8 he is not the sole actor in foreign affairs. The President must
seek the "advice and consent" of Congress with respect to treaty-making
and diplomatic appointments. 21 9 Moreover, Congress retains the power of
the purse, and may use it to shape presidential action in foreign affairs.
22 0
Congress's authority to regulate foreign commerce may impose a similar
limit. For example, when President Nixon imposed a surcharge on many
articles imported into the United States, his action was declared an uncon-
stitutional usurpation of the latter power.221 As in the area of military policy,
the President's foreign affairs power becomes attenuated when invoked as a
ground for domestic action. In the Watergate case, 222 the Supreme Court
held that the President has no inherent authority to conduct warrantless
electronic surveillance within the nation's borders. It would seem, then, that
the President's foreign policy power, like his power in military affairs, offers
little basis for resisting reasonable rules regulating domestic communications
on matters of nuclear policy.
One area where some of the broad rules and policies pertaining to presi-
dential prerogatives have been tested, with close ties to the subject under
consideration, is executive privilege. 223 Executive privilege is generally
invoked to enable the President or other high-ranking members of the execu-
tive branch to refuse to speak. Nevertheless the concerns raised in support
of such a refusal are similar to those that might be invoked to justify
dishonest or manipulative speech. Twice in the last 32 years, the Supreme
217 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
218 L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 158-63.
219 U.S. CoNsT. art. 2 § 2.
220 L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 166.
221 Yoshida International, Inc. v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 1155 (Cust. Ct.
1974). The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed, finding implied delegation
in the federal trading-with-the-enemy statute. 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
222 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
223 See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 4, § 4-14, at 202-12.
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Court has confronted claims of executive privilege by a sitting President.2 24
Each time, the Court has recognized that the privilege exists, while holding
that courts may determine the factual predicates that support the privi-
lege. 225 The courts also have the power to decide whether countervailing
considerations outweigh those underlying the claim of privilege. 2 26 When
courts have found against the President on a claim of privilege, he has
acquiesced. On the three occasions when presidents have been subpoenaed,
each has complied.
227
In the most recent Supreme Court decision concerning executive privi-
lege, United States v. Nixon, 228 the Court acknowledged the desirability of
preserving the confidentiality of high-level executive conversations. The
Court concluded, however, that the need to preserve the integrity of the
judicial system decisively outweighed the privilege.2 29 The Nixon case arose
in the context of the criminal prosecution of some of the Watergate defen-
dants. Other cases have held that executive privilege may also have to yield
in civil trials. In Halperin v. Kissinger, 230 a federal district court held that the
plaintiffs, who were suing for civil damages for the illegal wiretapping of




Protection of the integrity of the political processes and congressional
decisionmaking would seem to be an interest at least as strong as the
protection of the judiciary in a criminal or civil trial. Moreover, it would
seem that an executive's claim to a privilege to dissemble can rarely if ever
be as strong as the claims to a privilege to remain silent that were overridden
in recent cases. Consequently, considerations drawn from executive privi-
lege would seem to pose little obstacle to rules limiting executive branch
dissembling.
2 32
224 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. (1953), discussed in L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 202-06.
225 L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 204-05.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 206. The three Presidents were Jefferson, Monroe, and Nixon. Id.
228 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
229 Id. at 709.
230 401 F. Supp. 272 (D.D.C. 1975).
231 Id. at 275.
232 This conclusion is drawn from leading case law on presidential separation of
powers issues. The same conclusion follows from consideration of the policies
underlying separation of powers principles. According to Tribe, new patterns of
interaction among the branches of federal government should be judged by two
criteria: (i) their tendency to swell federal power in unaccountable ways; and (ii)
their tendency to leave either Congress or the Executive at the mercy of the other or
to reduce either's flexibility and independence unacceptably. L. TRIBE, supra note 4,
at 163. The first criterion would obviously not be violated by any of the suggestions
made in this section; all would limit, not swell, federal power. It might be argued that
rules curtailing the executive branch's ability to misrepresent nuclear matters to the
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CONCLUSION
This Article has suggested that government has systematically used de-
ceptive, manipulative language to influence the American people on matters
of nuclear strategy and weaponry. Such language is particularly effective
because of the nature of the threat of nuclear destruction and the ways in
which normal human minds react to that threat. Effective countercommuni-
cations are made difficult by government news management and official
secrecy. The combined effect is to falsify consent and insure perpetuation of
a military-political alliance based on heavy weapons spending and a policy of
nuclear deterrence.
Recent commentary has proposed that government speech may be regu-
lated on a lesser showing of need than that required to abridge private
speech. The fears that support special treatment for government speech are
particularly acute in connection with nuclear weaponry. To restore the
integrity of the political process and ensure full and informed debate on the
vital issue of nuclear policy, Congress and the courts may-in fact they
should-undertake remedial action. Narrowly tailored measures that draw
on the resources of both these branches could alleviate the threat to demo-
cratic decisionmaking, while respecting the legitimate functions of the exec-
utive branch.
American people reduce that branch's flexibility and range of options, but the
argument does not withstand examination. Active misrepresentation of the types
described in this article have no legitimate place in the government of a nation such as
ours. Thus, rules limiting such misrepresentation diminish only a range of action that
the government should not have in the first place.
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